Behavioral-based control of access to encrypted content by a process

ABSTRACT

Securing an endpoint against exposure to unsafe content includes encrypting files to prevent unauthorized access, and monitoring an exposure state of a process to potentially unsafe content by applying behavioral rules to determine whether the exposure state is either exposed or secure, where (1) the process is initially identified as secure, (2) the process is identified as exposed when the process opens a network connection to a URL that is not internal to an enterprise network of the endpoint and that has a poor reputation, (3) the process is identified as exposed when it opens a file identified as exposed, and (4) the process is identified as exposed when another exposed process opens a handle to the process. Access to the files may be restricted when the process is exposed by controlling access through a file system filter that conditionally decrypts files for the process according to its exposure state.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This application relates to enterprise network security, and morespecifically to methods and systems for improving detection of andresponse to malware and other security breaches.

BACKGROUND

Enterprise networks can contain valuable information that forms anincreasingly attractive target for malicious actors. Useful techniquesfor securing endpoints in a network against malicious activity aredescribed by way of example in commonly-owned U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 14/263,955, filed on Apr. 28, 2014, U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 14/263,966, filed Apr. 28, 2014, and U.S. application Ser. No.14/485,759, filed on Sep. 14, 2014, each of which is hereby incorporatedby reference in its entirety. However, there remains a need for improvedsecurity techniques to address the growing number, type andsophistication of malicious attacks deployed in today's networkenvironment.

SUMMARY

An extension to a file system on an endpoint supports transparent,process-level control over encryption and decryption of files. At thesame time an integrity monitor evaluates a security state of a processon the endpoint to detect when the process is compromised or otherwiseexposed to potentially unsafe content. The extension to the file systemcan receive security status information from the integrity monitor andresponsively apply rules for whether to allow or prohibit access toencrypted files within the file system on a process-by-process basis.

In an aspect, a computer program product for securing an endpointagainst exposure to unsafe or unknown content includescomputer-executable code embodied in a non-transitory computer readablemedium that, when executing on the endpoint performs the steps ofencrypting a plurality of files on an endpoint to prevent unauthorizedaccess to the plurality of files, monitoring an exposure state of aprocess on the endpoint to potentially unsafe content by applying aplurality of behavioral rules to determine whether the exposure state ofthe process is either exposed or secure, where (1) the process isinitially identified as secure, (2) the process is identified as exposedwhen the process opens a network connection to a Uniform ResourceLocator that is not internal to an enterprise network of the endpointand that has a reputation that is poor, (3) the process is identified asexposed when the process opens a first file that is identified asexposed, and (4) the process is identified as exposed when anotherexposed process opens a handle to the process. The computer programproduct may also include computer-executable code that performs the stepof restricting access by the process to the plurality of files when theprocess is exposed by controlling access to the plurality of filesthrough a file system filter that conditionally decrypts one or more ofthe plurality of files for the process according to the exposure stateof the process.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Thereputation of the Uniform Resource Locator may be obtained from a remotethreat management facility. The file system filter may conditionallydecrypt one or more of the plurality of files using a cryptographic key,where the file system filter is configured to respond to an indicationof compromise for the endpoint by deleting the cryptographic key on theendpoint. Restricting access by the process to the plurality of filesmay include maintaining access to any of the plurality of files thathave been opened by the process before the process became exposed, andpreventing access to other ones of the plurality of files.

In an aspect, a method includes encrypting a plurality of files on anendpoint to prevent unauthorized access to the plurality of files,monitoring an exposure state of a process on the endpoint to potentiallyunsafe content by applying a plurality of behavioral rules to determinewhether the exposure state of the process is either exposed or secure,where the process is initially identified as secure and the process isidentified as exposed based on contact with content other than theplurality of files, and restricting access by the process to theplurality of files when the process is exposed.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Themethod may include identifying the process as exposed according to theplurality of behavioral rules, where (1) the process is identified asexposed when the process opens a network connection to a UniformResource Locator that is not internal to an enterprise network of theendpoint and that has a reputation that is poor, (2) the process isidentified as exposed when the process opens a first file that isidentified as exposed, and (3) the process is identified as exposed whenanother exposed process opens a handle to the process. The method mayfurther include identifying the first file as exposed when at least oneof the following conditions is met: (1) the first file is not one of theplurality of files, (2) the first file is saved by a second process thatis identified as exposed, and (3) a source of the first file has a lowreputation. The first file may be identified as exposed based upon ascan of the first file. The reputation for the Uniform Resource Locatormay be obtained from a remote threat management facility. Restrictingaccess by the process to the plurality of files may include controllingaccess through an extension to a file system for the endpoint, where theextension conditionally decrypts one or more of the plurality of filesfor the process according to the exposure state of the process. Theextension may conditionally decrypt one or more of the plurality offiles using a cryptographic key, where the extension is configured torespond to an indication of compromise for the endpoint by deleting thecryptographic key on the endpoint. The extension may include at leastone of a mount point for the file system and a file system filter forthe file system. Restricting access by the process to the plurality offiles may include maintaining access to any of the plurality of filesthat have been opened by the process before the process became exposed,and preventing access to other ones of the plurality of files. Themethod may include monitoring a security state of the process andrestricting access by the process to the plurality of files when thesecurity state is compromised. Monitoring the security state may includeremotely monitoring the security state at a threat management facilityor locally monitoring the security state with a malware file scanner.The method may include initiating a remediation of the process when theprocess is exposed, the remediation including facilitating a restart ofthe process. If the remediation is successful, the method may includerestoring access to all of the plurality of files by the process. Themethod may include providing a notification to a user in a display ofthe endpoint, the notification indicating a required remediation stepfor the process to resolve the exposure state, and the notificationinforming the user that an application associated with the processcannot access additional files until the user completes the requiredremediation step.

In an aspect, a system includes an endpoint, a first memory on theendpoint storing a plurality of files encrypted to prevent unauthorizedaccess, a process executing on the endpoint, and a file system on theendpoint configured to manage access to the plurality of files by theprocess, the file system including an extension configured to monitor anexposure state of the process and to restrict access to the one of thefiles based on the exposure state of the process by conditionallydecrypting the one of the files based on the exposure state. The systemmay also include an integrity monitor configured to evaluate theexposure state by applying a plurality of behavioral rules to determinewhether the exposure state of the process is either exposed or secure,where the process is initially identified as secure and the process isidentified as exposed based on contact with content other than theplurality of files. The system may further include a remediationcomponent configured to remediate the process from the exposed state tothe secure state for unrestricted access to the plurality of files.

Implementations may include one or more of the following features. Theintegrity monitor may be further configured to identify the process asexposed according to the plurality of behavioral rules, where (1) theprocess is identified as exposed when the process opens a networkconnection to a Uniform Resource Locator that is not internal to anenterprise network of the endpoint and that has a reputation that ispoor, (2) the process is identified as exposed when the process opens afirst file that is identified as exposed, and (3) the process isidentified as exposed when another exposed process opens a handle to theprocess. The extension to the file system may include at least one of amount point and a file system filter. The extension to the file systemmay maintain access to any of the plurality of files that have beenopened by the process before the process became exposed, and preventaccess to other ones of the plurality of files.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The foregoing and other objects, features and advantages of the devices,systems, and methods described herein will be apparent from thefollowing description of particular embodiments thereof, as illustratedin the accompanying drawings. The drawings are not necessarily to scale,emphasis instead being placed upon illustrating the principles of thedevices, systems, and methods described herein.

FIG. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management.

FIG. 2 illustrates a computer system.

FIG. 3 illustrates a threat management system.

FIG. 4 illustrates a system for behavioral tracking, coloring, andgeneration of indications of compromise (IOCs).

FIG. 5 illustrates a system for encryption management.

FIG. 6 illustrates a threat management system using heartbeats.

FIG. 7 shows an architecture for endpoint protection in an enterprisenetwork security system.

FIG. 8 shows a method for securing an endpoint.

FIG. 9 shows a method for securing an endpoint.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments will now be described with reference to the accompanyingfigures, in which preferred embodiments are shown. The foregoing may,however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construedas limited to the illustrated embodiments set forth herein.

All documents mentioned herein are hereby incorporated by reference intheir entirety. References to items in the singular should be understoodto include items in the plural, and vice versa, unless explicitly statedotherwise or clear from the context. Grammatical conjunctions areintended to express any and all disjunctive and conjunctive combinationsof conjoined clauses, sentences, words, and the like, unless otherwisestated or clear from the context. Thus, the term “or” should generallybe understood to mean “and/or” and so forth.

Recitation of ranges of values herein are not intended to be limiting,referring instead individually to any and all values falling within therange, unless otherwise indicated herein, and each separate value withinsuch a range is incorporated into the specification as if it wereindividually recited herein. The words “about,” “approximately,” or thelike, when accompanying a numerical value, are to be construed asindicating a deviation as would be appreciated by one of ordinary skillin the art to operate satisfactorily for an intended purpose. Ranges ofvalues and/or numeric values are provided herein as examples only, anddo not constitute a limitation on the scope of the describedembodiments. The use of any and all examples, or exemplary language(“e.g.,” “such as,” or the like) provided herein, is intended merely tobetter illuminate the embodiments and does not pose a limitation on thescope of the embodiments or the claims. No language in the specificationshould be construed as indicating any unclaimed element as essential tothe practice of the embodiments.

In the following description, it is understood that terms such as“first,” “second,” “third,” “above,” “below,” and the like, are words ofconvenience and are not to be construed as implying a chronologicalorder or otherwise limiting any corresponding element unless expresslystate otherwise.

FIG. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management. Specifically,FIG. 1 depicts a block diagram of a threat management system providingprotection to an enterprise against a plurality of threats—a context inwhich the following techniques may usefully be deployed. One aspectrelates to corporate policy management and implementation through aunified threat management facility 100. As will be explained in moredetail below, a threat management facility 100 may be used to protectcomputer assets from many threats, both computer-generated threats anduser-generated threats. The threat management facility 100 may bemulti-dimensional in that it may be designed to protect corporate assetsfrom a variety of threats and it may be adapted to learn about threatsin one dimension (e.g. worm detection) and apply the knowledge inanother dimension (e.g. spam detection). Policy management is one of thedimensions for which the threat management facility can provide acontrol capability. A corporation or other entity may institute a policythat prevents certain people (e.g. employees, groups of employees, typesof employees, guest of the corporation, etc.) from accessing certaintypes of computer programs. For example, the corporation may elect toprevent its accounting department from using a particular version of aninstant messaging service or all such services. In this example, thepolicy management facility 112 may be used to update the policies of allcorporate computing assets with a proper policy control facility or itmay update a select few. By using the threat management facility 100 tofacilitate the setting, updating and control of such policies thecorporation only needs to be concerned with keeping the threatmanagement facility 100 up to date on such policies. The threatmanagement facility 100 can take care of updating all of the othercorporate computing assets.

It should be understood that the threat management facility 100 mayprovide multiple services, and policy management may be offered as oneof the services. We will now turn to a description of certaincapabilities and components of the threat management system 100.

Over recent years, malware has become a major problem across theInternet 154. From both a technical perspective and a user perspective,the categorization of a specific threat type, whether as virus, worm,spam, phishing exploration, spyware, adware, or the like, is becomingreduced in significance. The threat, no matter how it is categorized,may need to be stopped at various points of a networked computingenvironment, such as one of an enterprise facility 102, including at oneor more laptops, desktops, servers, gateways, communication ports,handheld or mobile devices, firewalls, and the like. Similarly, theremay be less and less benefit to the user in having different solutionsfor known and unknown threats. As such, a consolidated threat managementfacility 100 may need to apply a similar set of technologies andcapabilities for all threats. In certain embodiments, the threatmanagement facility 100 may provide a single agent on the desktop, and asingle scan of any suspect file. This approach may eliminate theinevitable overlaps and gaps in protection caused by treating virusesand spyware as separate problems, while simultaneously simplifyingadministration and minimizing desktop load. As the number and range oftypes of threats has increased, so may have the level of connectivityavailable to all IT users. This may have led to a rapid increase in thespeed at which threats may move. Today, an unprotected PC connected tothe Internet 154 may be infected quickly (perhaps within 10 minutes)which may require acceleration for the delivery of threat protection.Where once monthly updates may have been sufficient, the threatmanagement facility 100 may automatically and seamlessly update itsproduct set against spam and virus threats quickly, for instance, everyfive minutes, every minute, continuously, or the like. Analysis andtesting may be increasingly automated, and also may be performed morefrequently; for instance, it may be completed in 15 minutes, and may doso without compromising quality. The threat management facility 100 mayalso extend techniques that may have been developed for virus andmalware protection, and provide them to enterprise facility 102 networkadministrators to better control their environments. In addition tostopping malicious code, the threat management facility 100 may providepolicy management that may be able to control legitimate applications,such as VoIP, instant messaging, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and thelike, that may undermine productivity and network performance within theenterprise facility 102.

The threat management facility 100 may provide an enterprise facility102 protection from computer-based malware, including viruses, spyware,adware, Trojans, intrusion, spam, policy abuse, uncontrolled access, andthe like, where the enterprise facility 102 may be any entity with anetworked computer-based infrastructure. In an embodiment, FIG. 1 maydepict a block diagram of the threat management facility 100 providingprotection to an enterprise against a plurality of threats. Theenterprise facility 102 may be corporate, commercial, educational,governmental, or the like, and the enterprise facility's 102 computernetwork may be distributed amongst a plurality of facilities, and in aplurality of geographical locations, and may include administration 134,a firewall 138A, an appliance 140A, server 142A, network devices 148A-B,clients 144A-D, such as protected by computer security facilities 152,and the like. It will be understood that any reference herein to clientfacilities may include the clients 144A-D shown in FIG. 1 andvice-versa. The threat management facility 100 may include a pluralityof functions, such as security management facility 122, policymanagement facility 112, update facility 120, definitions facility 114,network access rules facility 124, remedial action facility 128,detection techniques facility 130, testing facility 118, threat researchfacility 132, and the like. In embodiments, the threat protectionprovided by the threat management facility 100 may extend beyond thenetwork boundaries of the enterprise facility 102 to include clients144D (or client facilities) that have moved into network connectivitynot directly associated or controlled by the enterprise facility 102.Threats to client facilities may come from a plurality of sources, suchas from network threats 104, physical proximity threats 110, secondarylocation threats 108, and the like. Clients 144A-D may be protected fromthreats even when the client 144A-D is not located in association withthe enterprise 102, such as when a client 144E-F moves in and out of theenterprise facility 102, for example when interfacing with anunprotected server 142C through the Internet 154, when a client 144F ismoving into a secondary location threat 108 such as interfacing withcomponents 140B, 142B, 148C, 148D that are not protected, and the like.In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may provide anenterprise facility 102 protection from a plurality of threats tomultiplatform computer resources in a plurality of locations and networkconfigurations, with an integrated system approach.

In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may be provided as astand-alone solution. In other embodiments, the threat managementfacility 100 may be integrated into a third-party product. Anapplication programming interface (e.g. a source code interface) may beprovided such that the threat management facility 100 may be integrated.For instance, the threat management facility 100 may be stand-alone inthat it provides direct threat protection to an enterprise or computerresource, where protection is subscribed to directly 100. Alternatively,the threat management facility 100 may offer protection indirectly,through a third-party product, where an enterprise may subscribe toservices through the third-party product, and threat protection to theenterprise may be provided by the threat management facility 100 throughthe third-party product.

The security management facility 122 may include a plurality of elementsthat provide protection from malware to enterprise facility 102 computerresources, including endpoint security and control, email security andcontrol, web security and control, reputation-based filtering, controlof unauthorized users, control of guest and non-compliant computers, andthe like. The security management facility 122 may be a softwareapplication that may provide malicious code and malicious applicationprotection to a client facility computing resource. The securitymanagement facility 122 may have the ability to scan the client facilityfiles for malicious code, remove or quarantine certain applications andfiles, prevent certain actions, perform remedial actions and performother security measures. In embodiments, scanning the client facilitymay include scanning some or all of the files stored to the clientfacility on a periodic basis, scanning an application when theapplication is executed, scanning files as the files are transmitted toor from the client facility, or the like. The scanning of theapplications and files may be performed to detect known malicious codeor known unwanted applications. In an embodiment, new malicious code andunwanted applications may be continually developed and distributed, andupdates to the known code database may be provided on a periodic basis,on a demand basis, on an alert basis, or the like.

The security management facility 122 may provide email security andcontrol, where security management may help to eliminate spam, viruses,spyware and phishing, control of email content, and the like. Thesecurity management facility's 122 email security and control mayprotect against inbound and outbound threats, protect emailinfrastructure, prevent data leakage, provide spam filtering, and thelike. In an embodiment, security management facility 122 may provide forweb security and control, where security management may help to detector block viruses, spyware, malware, unwanted applications, help controlweb browsing, and the like, which may provide comprehensive web accesscontrol enabling safe, productive web browsing. Web security and controlmay provide Internet use policies, reporting on suspect devices,security and content filtering, active monitoring of network traffic,URI filtering, and the like. In an embodiment, the security managementfacility 122 may provide for network access control, which may providecontrol over network connections. Network control may stop unauthorized,guest, or non-compliant systems from accessing networks, and may controlnetwork traffic that may not be bypassed from the client level. Inaddition, network access control may control access to virtual privatenetworks (VPN), where VPNs may be a communications network tunneledthrough another network, establishing a logical connection acting as avirtual network. In embodiments, a VPN may be treated in the same manneras a physical network.

The security management facility 122 may provide host intrusionprevention through behavioral based protection, which may guard againstunknown threats by analyzing behavior before software code executes.Behavioral based protection may monitor code when it runs and interveneif the code is deemed to be suspicious or malicious. Advantages ofbehavioral based protection over runtime protection may include codebeing prevented from running. Whereas runtime protection may onlyinterrupt code that has already partly executed, behavioral protectioncan identify malicious code at the gateway or on the file servers anddelete the code before it can reach endpoint computers and the like.

The security management facility 122 may provide reputation filtering,which may target or identify sources of known malware. For instance,reputation filtering may include lists of URIs of known sources ofmalware or known suspicious IP addresses, or domains, say for spam, thatwhen detected may invoke an action by the threat management facility100, such as dropping them immediately. By dropping the source beforeany interaction can initiate, potential threat sources may be thwartedbefore any exchange of data can be made.

In embodiments, information may be sent from the enterprise back to athird party, a vendor, or the like, which may lead to improvedperformance of the threat management facility 100. For example, thetypes, times, and number of virus interactions that a client experiencesmay provide useful information for the preventions of future virusthreats. This type of feedback may be useful for any aspect of threatdetection. Feedback of information may also be associated with behaviorsof individuals within the enterprise, such as being associated with mostcommon violations of policy, network access, unauthorized applicationloading, unauthorized external device use, and the like. In embodiments,this type of information feedback may enable the evaluation or profilingof client actions that are violations of policy that may provide apredictive model for the improvement of enterprise policies.

The security management facility 122 may support overall security of theenterprise facility 102 network or set of enterprise facility 102networks, e.g., by providing updates of malicious code information tothe enterprise facility 102 network and associated client facilities.The updates may include a planned update, an update in reaction to athreat notice, an update in reaction to a request for an update, anupdate based on a search of known malicious code information, or thelike. The administration facility 134 may provide control over thesecurity management facility 122 when updates are performed. The updatesmay be automatically transmitted without an administration facility's134 direct control, manually transmitted by the administration facility134, or otherwise distributed. The security management facility 122 maymanage the receipt of malicious code descriptions from a provider,distribution of the malicious code descriptions to enterprise facility102 networks, distribution of the malicious code descriptions to clientfacilities, and so forth.

The threat management facility 100 may provide a policy managementfacility 112 that may be able to block non-malicious applications, suchas VoIP, instant messaging, peer-to-peer file-sharing, and the like,that may undermine productivity and network performance within theenterprise facility 102. The policy management facility 112 may be a setof rules or policies that may indicate enterprise facility 102 accesspermissions for the client facility, such as access permissionsassociated with the network, applications, external computer devices,and the like. The policy management facility 112 may include a database,a text file, a combination of databases and text files, or the like. Inan embodiment, a policy database may be a block list, a black list, anallowed list, a white list, or the like that may provide a list ofenterprise facility 102 external network locations/applications that mayor may not be accessed by the client facility. The policy managementfacility 112 may include rules that may be interpreted with respect toan enterprise facility 102 network access request to determine if therequest should be allowed. The rules may provide a generic rule for thetype of access that may be granted. The rules may be related to thepolicies of an enterprise facility 102 for access rights for theenterprise facility's 102 client facility. For example, there may be arule that does not permit access to sporting websites. When a website isrequested by the client facility, a security facility may access therules within a policy facility to determine if the requested access isrelated to a sporting website. In an embodiment, the security facilitymay analyze the requested website to determine if the website matcheswith any of the policy facility rules.

The policy management facility 112 may be similar to the securitymanagement facility 122 but with the addition of enterprise facility 102wide access rules and policies that may be distributed to maintaincontrol of client facility access to enterprise facility 102 networkresources. The policies may be defined for application type, subset ofapplication capabilities, organization hierarchy, computer facilitytype, user type, network location, time of day, connection type, or thelike. Policies may be maintained by the administration facility 134,through the threat management facility 100, in association with a thirdparty, or the like. For example, a policy may restrict IM activity toonly support personnel for communicating with customers. This may allowcommunication for departments requiring access, but may maintain thenetwork bandwidth for other activities by restricting the use of IM toonly the personnel that need access to instant messaging (IM) in supportof the enterprise facility 102. In an embodiment, the policy managementfacility 112 may be a stand-alone application, may be part of thenetwork server facility 142, may be part of the enterprise facility 102network, may be part of the client facility, or the like.

The threat management facility 100 may provide configuration management,which may be similar to policy management, but may specifically examinethe configuration set of applications, operating systems, hardware, andthe like, and manage changes to their configurations. Assessment of aconfiguration may be made against a standard configuration policy,detection of configuration changes, remediation of improperconfiguration, application of new configurations, and the like. Anenterprise may keep a set of standard configuration rules and policieswhich may represent the desired state of the device. For example, aclient firewall may be running and installed, but in the disabled state,where remediation may be to enable the firewall. In another example, theenterprise may set a rule that disallows the use of USB disks, and sendsa configuration change to all clients, which turns off USB drive accessvia a registry.

The threat management facility 100 may also provide for the removal ofapplications that potentially interfere with the operation of the threatmanagement facility 100, such as competitor products that may also beattempting similar threat management functions. The removal of suchproducts may be initiated automatically whenever such products aredetected. In the case where such applications are services are providedindirectly through a third-party product, the application may besuspended until action is taken to remove or disable the third-partyproduct's protection facility.

Threat management against a quickly evolving malware environment mayrequire timely updates, and thus an update management facility 120 maybe provided by the threat management facility 100. In addition, a policymanagement facility 112 may also require update management (e.g., asprovided by the update facility 120 herein described). The updatemanagement for the security facility 122 and policy management facility112 may be provided directly by the threat management facility 100, suchas by a hosted system or in conjunction with the administration facility134. In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may provide forpatch management, where a patch may be an update to an operating system,an application, a system tool, or the like, where one of the reasons forthe patch is to reduce vulnerability to threats.

The security facility 122 and policy management facility 112 may pushinformation to the enterprise facility 102 network and/or clientfacility. The enterprise facility 102 network and/or client facility mayalso or instead pull information from the security facility 122 andpolicy management facility 112 network server facilities 142, or theremay be a combination of pushing and pulling of information between thesecurity facility 122 and the policy management facility 112 networkservers 142, enterprise facility 102 network, and client facilities, orthe like. For example, the enterprise facility 102 network and/or clientfacility may pull information from the security facility 122 and policymanagement facility 112 network server facility 142 may request theinformation using the security facility 122 and policy managementfacility 112 update module; the request may be based on a certain timeperiod, by a certain time, by a date, on demand, or the like. In anotherexample, the security facility 122 and policy management facility 112network servers 142 may push the information to the enterprisefacility's 102 network and/or client facility by providing notificationthat there are updates available for download and then transmitting theinformation. The combination of the security management 122 networkserver facility 142 and security update module may functionsubstantially the same as the policy management facility 112 networkserver and policy update module by providing information to theenterprise facility 102 network and the client facility in a push orpull method. In an embodiment, the policy management facility 112 andthe security facility 122 management update modules may work in concertto provide information to the enterprise facility's 102 network and/orclient facility for control of application execution. In an embodiment,the policy update module and security update module may be combined intoa single update module.

As threats are identified and characterized, the threat managementfacility 100 may create definition updates that may be used to allow thethreat management facility 100 to detect and remediate the latestmalicious software, unwanted applications, configuration and policychanges, and the like. The threat definition facility 114 may containthreat identification updates, also referred to as definition files. Adefinition file may be a virus identity file that may includedefinitions of known or potential malicious code. The virus identity(IDE) definition files may provide information that may identifymalicious code within files, applications, or the like. The definitionfiles may be accessed by security management facility 122 when scanningfiles or applications within the client facility for the determinationof malicious code that may be within the file or application. Thedefinition files may contain a number of commands, definitions, orinstructions, to be parsed and acted upon, or the like. In embodiments,the client facility may be updated with new definition filesperiodically to provide the client facility with the most recentmalicious code definitions; the updating may be performed on a set timeperiod, may be updated on demand from the client facility, may beupdated on demand from the network, may be updated on a receivedmalicious code alert, or the like. In an embodiment, the client facilitymay request an update to the definition files from an update facility120 within the network, may request updated definition files from acomputing facility external to the network, updated definition files maybe provided to the client facility 114 from within the network,definition files may be provided to the client facility from an externalcomputing facility from an external network, or the like.

A definition management facility 114 may provide timely updates ofdefinition files information to the network, client facilities, and thelike. New and altered malicious code and malicious applications may becontinually created and distributed to networks worldwide. Thedefinition files that maintain the definitions of the malicious code andmalicious application information for the protection of the networks andclient facilities may need continual updating to provide continualdefense of the network and client facility from the malicious code andmalicious applications. The definition files management may provide forautomatic and manual methods of updating the definition files. Inembodiments, the network may receive definition files and distribute thedefinition files to the network client facilities, the client facilitiesmay receive the definition files directly, or the network and clientfacilities may both receive the definition files, or the like. In anembodiment, the definition files may be updated on a fixed periodicbasis, on demand by the network and/or the client facility, as a resultof an alert of a new malicious code or malicious application, or thelike. In an embodiment, the definition files may be released as asupplemental file to an existing definition files to provide for rapidupdating of the definition files.

In a similar manner, the security management facility 122 may be used toscan an outgoing file and verify that the outgoing file is permitted tobe transmitted per the enterprise facility 102 rules and policies. Bychecking outgoing files, the security management facility 122 may beable discover malicious code infected files that were not detected asincoming files as a result of the client facility having been updatedwith either new definition files or policy management facility 112information. The definition files may discover the malicious codeinfected file by having received updates of developing malicious codefrom the administration facility 134, updates from a definition filesprovider, or the like. The policy management facility 112 may discoverthe malicious code infected file by having received new updates from theadministration facility 134, from a rules provider, or the like.

The threat management facility 100 may provide controlled access to theenterprise facility 102 networks. For instance, a manager of theenterprise facility 102 may want to restrict access to certainapplications, networks, files, printers, servers, databases, or thelike. In addition, the manager of the enterprise facility 102 may wantto restrict user access based on certain criteria, such as the user'slocation, usage history, need to know, job position, connection type,time of day, method of authentication, client-system configuration, orthe like. Network access rules may be developed for the enterprisefacility 102, or pre-packaged by a supplier, and managed by the threatmanagement facility 100 in conjunction with the administration facility134.

A network access rules facility 124 may be responsible for determiningif a client facility application should be granted access to a requestednetwork location. The network location may be on the same network as thefacility or may be on another network. In an embodiment, the networkaccess rules facility 124 may verify access rights for client facilitiesfrom within the network or may verify access rights of computerfacilities from external networks. When network access for a clientfacility is denied, the network access rules facility 124 may send aninformation file to the client facility containing. For example, theinformation sent by the network access rules facility 124 may be a datafile. The data file may contain a number of commands, definitions,instructions, or the like to be parsed and acted upon through theremedial action facility 128, or the like. The information sent by thenetwork access facility rules facility 124 may be a command or commandfile that the remedial action facility 128 may access and take actionupon.

The network access rules facility 124 may include databases such as ablock list, a black list, an allowed list, a white list, an unacceptablenetwork site database, an acceptable network site database, a networksite reputation database, or the like of network access locations thatmay or may not be accessed by the client facility. Additionally, thenetwork access rules facility 124 may incorporate rule evaluation; therule evaluation may parse network access requests and apply the parsedinformation to network access rules. The network access rule facility124 may have a generic set of rules that may be in support of anenterprise facility's 102 network access policies, such as denyingaccess to certain types of websites, controlling instant messengeraccesses, or the like. Rule evaluation may include regular expressionrule evaluation, or other rule evaluation method for interpreting thenetwork access request and comparing the interpretation to theestablished rules for network access. In an embodiment, the networkaccess rules facility 124 may receive a rules evaluation request fromthe network access control and may return the rules evaluation to thenetwork access control.

Similar to the threat definitions facility 114, the network access rulefacility 124 may provide updated rules and policies to the enterprisefacility 102. The network access rules facility 124 may be maintained bythe network administration facility 134, using network access rulesfacility 124 management. In an embodiment, the network administrationfacility 134 may be able to maintain a set of access rules manually byadding rules, changing rules, deleting rules, or the like. Additionally,the administration facility 134 may retrieve predefined rule sets from aremote provider of a set of rules to be applied to an entire enterprisefacility 102. The network administration facility 134 may be able tomodify the predefined rules as needed for a particular enterprisefacility 102 using the network access rules management facility 124.

When a threat or policy violation is detected by the threat managementfacility 100, the threat management facility 100 may perform or initiatea remedial action facility 128. Remedial action may take a plurality offorms, such as terminating or modifying an ongoing process orinteraction, sending a warning to a client or administration facility134 of an ongoing process or interaction, executing a program orapplication to remediate against a threat or violation, recordinteractions for subsequent evaluation, or the like. Remedial action maybe associated with an application that responds to information that aclient facility network access request has been denied. In anembodiment, when the data file is received, remedial action may parsethe data file, interpret the various aspects of the data file, and acton the parsed data file information to determine actions to be taken onan application requesting access to a denied network location. In anembodiment, when the data file is received, remedial action may accessthe threat definitions to parse the data file and determine an action tobe taken on an application requesting access to a denied networklocation. In an embodiment, the information received from the facilitymay be a command or a command file. The remedial action facility maycarry out any commands that are received or parsed from a data file fromthe facility without performing any interpretation of the commands. Inan embodiment, the remedial action facility may interact with thereceived information and may perform various actions on a clientrequesting access to a denied network location. The action may be one ormore of continuing to block all requests to a denied network location, amalicious code scan on the application, a malicious code scan on theclient facility, quarantine of the application, terminating theapplication, isolation of the application, isolation of the clientfacility to a location within the network that restricts network access,blocking a network access port from a client facility, reporting theapplication to an administration facility 134, or the like.

Remedial action may be provided as a result of a detection of a threator violation. The detection techniques facility 130 may includemonitoring the enterprise facility 102 network or endpoint devices, suchas by monitoring streaming data through the gateway, across the network,through routers and hubs, and the like. The detection techniquesfacility 130 may include monitoring activity and stored files oncomputing facilities, such as on server facilities 142, desktopcomputers, laptop computers, other mobile computing devices, and thelike. Detection techniques, such as scanning a computer's stored files,may provide the capability of checking files for stored threats, eitherin the active or passive state. Detection techniques, such as streamingfile management, may provide the capability of checking files receivedat the network, gateway facility, client facility, and the like. Thismay provide the capability of not allowing a streaming file or portionsof the streaming file containing malicious code from entering the clientfacility, gateway facility, or network. In an embodiment, the streamingfile may be broken into blocks of information, and a plurality of virusidentities may be used to check each of the blocks of information formalicious code. In an embodiment, any blocks that are not determined tobe clear of malicious code may not be delivered to the client facility,gateway facility, or network.

Verifying that the threat management facility 100 is detecting threatsand violations to established policy, may require the ability to testthe system, either at the system level or for a particular computingcomponent. The testing facility 118 may allow the administrationfacility 134 to coordinate the testing of the security configurations ofclient facility computing facilities on a network. The administrationfacility 134 may be able to send test files to a set of client facilitycomputing facilities to test the ability of the client facility todetermine acceptability of the test file. After the test file has beentransmitted, a recording facility may record the actions taken by theclient facility in reaction to the test file. The recording facility mayaggregate the testing information from the client facility and reportthe testing information to the administration facility 134. Theadministration facility 134 may be able to determine the level ofpreparedness of the client facility computing facilities by the reportedinformation. Remedial action may be taken for any of the client facilitycomputing facilities as determined by the administration facility 134;remedial action may be taken by the administration facility 134 or bythe user of the client facility.

The threat research facility 132 may provide a continuously ongoingeffort to maintain the threat protection capabilities of the threatmanagement facility 100 in light of continuous generation of new orevolved forms of malware. Threat research may include researchers andanalysts working on known and emerging malware, such as viruses,rootkits a spyware, as well as other computer threats such as phishing,spam, scams, and the like. In embodiments, through threat research, thethreat management facility 100 may be able to provide swift, globalresponses to the latest threats.

The threat management facility 100 may provide threat protection to theenterprise facility 102, where the enterprise facility 102 may include aplurality of networked components, such as client facility, serverfacility 142, administration facility 134, firewall 138, gateway, hubsand routers 148, threat management appliance 140, desktop users, mobileusers, and the like. In embodiments, it may be the endpoint computersecurity facility 152, located on a computer's desktop, which mayprovide threat protection to a user, and associated enterprise facility102. In embodiments, the term endpoint may refer to a computer systemthat may source data, receive data, evaluate data, buffer data, or thelike (such as a user's desktop computer as an endpoint computer), afirewall as a data evaluation endpoint computer system, a laptop as amobile endpoint computer, a personal digital assistant or tablet as ahand-held endpoint computer, a mobile phone as an endpoint computer, orthe like. In embodiments, endpoint may refer to a source or destinationfor data, including such components where the destination ischaracterized by an evaluation point for data, and where the data may besent to a subsequent destination after evaluation. The endpoint computersecurity facility 152 may be an application loaded onto the computerplatform or computer support component, where the application mayaccommodate the plurality of computer platforms and/or functionalrequirements of the component. For instance, a client facility computermay be one of a plurality of computer platforms, such as Windows,Macintosh, Linux, and the like, where the endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may be adapted to the specific platform, while maintaininga uniform product and product services across platforms. Additionally,components may have different functions to serve within the enterprisefacility's 102 networked computer-based infrastructure. For instance,computer support components provided as hubs and routers 148, serverfacility 142, firewalls 138, and the like, may require unique securityapplication software to protect their portion of the systeminfrastructure, while providing an element in an integrated threatmanagement system that extends out beyond the threat management facility100 to incorporate all computer resources under its protection.

The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of client facilitycomputing platforms on which the endpoint computer security facility 152is adapted. A client facility computing platform may be a computersystem that is able to access a service on another computer, such as aserver facility 142, via a network. This client facility server facility142 model may apply to a plurality of networked applications, such as aclient facility connecting to an enterprise facility 102 applicationserver facility 142, a web browser client facility connecting to a webserver facility 142, an e-mail client facility retrieving e-mail from anInternet 154 service provider's mail storage servers 142, and the like.In embodiments, traditional large client facility applications may beswitched to websites, which may increase the browser's role as a clientfacility. Clients 144 may be classified as a function of the extent towhich they perform their own processing. For instance, client facilitiesare sometimes classified as a fat client facility or thin clientfacility. The fat client facility, also known as a thick client facilityor rich client facility, may be a client facility that performs the bulkof data processing operations itself, and does not necessarily rely onthe server facility 142. The fat client facility may be most common inthe form of a personal computer, where the personal computer may operateindependent of any server facility 142. Programming environments for fatclients 144 may include CURT, Delphi, Droplets, Java, win32, X11, andthe like. Thin clients 144 may offer minimal processing capabilities,for instance, the thin client facility may primarily provide a graphicaluser interface provided by an application server facility 142, which mayperform the bulk of any required data processing. Programmingenvironments for thin clients 144 may include JavaScript/AJAX, ASP, JSP,Ruby on Rails, Python's Django, PHP, and the like. The client facilitymay also be a mix of the two, such as processing data locally, butrelying on a server facility 142 for data storage. As a result, thishybrid client facility may provide benefits from both the fat clientfacility type, such as multimedia support and high performance, and thethin client facility type, such as high manageability and flexibility.In embodiments, the threat management facility 100, and associatedendpoint computer security facility 152, may provide seamless threatprotection to the plurality of clients 144, and client facility types,across the enterprise facility 102.

The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of server facilities142, such as application servers, communications servers, file servers,database servers, proxy servers, mail servers, fax servers, gameservers, web servers, and the like. A server facility 142, which mayalso be referred to as a server facility 142 application, serverfacility 142 operating system, server facility 142 computer, or thelike, may be an application program or operating system that acceptsclient facility connections in order to service requests from clients144. The server facility 142 application may run on the same computer asthe client facility using it, or the server facility 142 and the clientfacility may be running on different computers and communicating acrossthe network. Server facility 142 applications may be divided amongserver facility 142 computers, with the dividing depending upon theworkload. For instance, under light load conditions all server facility142 applications may run on a single computer and under heavy loadconditions a single server facility 142 application may run on multiplecomputers. In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 mayprovide threat protection to server facilities 142 within the enterprisefacility 102 as load conditions and application changes are made.

A server facility 142 may also be an appliance facility 140, where theappliance facility 140 provides specific services onto the network.Though the appliance facility 140 is a server facility 142 computer,that may be loaded with a server facility 142 operating system andserver facility 142 application, the enterprise facility 102 user maynot need to configure it, as the configuration may have been performedby a third party. In an embodiment, an enterprise facility 102 appliancemay be a server facility 142 appliance that has been configured andadapted for use with the threat management facility 100, and locatedwithin the facilities of the enterprise facility 102. The enterprisefacility's 102 threat management appliance may enable the enterprisefacility 102 to administer an on-site local managed threat protectionconfiguration, where the administration facility 134 may access thethreat resources through an interface, such as a web portal. In analternate embodiment, the enterprise facility 102 may be managedremotely from a third party, vendor, or the like, without an appliancefacility 140 located within the enterprise facility 102. In thisinstance, the appliance functionality may be a shared hardware productbetween pluralities of enterprises 102. In embodiments, the appliancefacility 140 may be located at the enterprise facility 102, where theenterprise facility 102 maintains a degree of control. In embodiments, ahosted service may be provided, where the appliance 140 may still be anon-site black box to the enterprise facility 102, physically placedthere because of infrastructure requirements, but managed by a thirdparty, vendor, or the like.

Simple server facility 142 appliances may also be utilized across theenterprise facility's 102 network infrastructure, such as switches,routers, wireless routers, hubs and routers, gateways, print servers,net modems, and the like. These simple server facility appliances maynot require configuration by the enterprise facility 102, but mayrequire protection from threats via an endpoint computer securityfacility 152. These appliances may provide interconnection serviceswithin the enterprise facility 102 network, and therefore may advancethe spread of a threat if not properly protected.

A client facility may be protected from threats from within theenterprise facility 102 network using a personal firewall, which may bea hardware firewall, software firewall, or combination of these, thatcontrols network traffic to and from a client. The personal firewall maypermit or deny communications based on a security policy. Personalfirewalls may be designed for use by end-users, which may result inprotection for only the computer on which it's installed. Personalfirewalls may be able to control network traffic by providing promptseach time a connection is attempted and adapting security policyaccordingly. Personal firewalls may also provide some level of intrusiondetection, which may allow the software to terminate or blockconnectivity where it suspects an intrusion is being attempted. Otherfeatures that may be provided by a personal firewall may include alertsabout outgoing connection attempts, control of program access tonetworks, hiding the client from port scans by not responding tounsolicited network traffic, monitoring of applications that may belistening for incoming connections, monitoring and regulation ofincoming and outgoing network traffic, prevention of unwanted networktraffic from installed applications, reporting applications that makeconnection attempts, reporting destination servers with whichapplications may be attempting communications, and the like. Inembodiments, the personal firewall may be provided by the threatmanagement facility 100.

Another important component that may be protected by an endpointcomputer security facility 152 is a network firewall facility 138, whichmay be a hardware or software device that may be configured to permit,deny, or proxy data through a computer network that has different levelsof trust in its source of data. For instance, an internal enterprisefacility 102 network may have a high level of trust, because the sourceof all data has been sourced from within the enterprise facility 102. Anexample of a low level of trust is the Internet 154, because the sourceof data may be unknown. A zone with an intermediate trust level,situated between the Internet 154 and a trusted internal network, may bereferred to as a “perimeter network.” Since firewall facilities 138represent boundaries between threat levels, the endpoint computersecurity facility 152 associated with the firewall facility 138 mayprovide resources that may control the flow of threats at thisenterprise facility 102 network entry point. Firewall facilities 138,and associated endpoint computer security facility 152, may also beassociated with a network node that may be equipped for interfacingbetween networks that use different protocols. In embodiments, theendpoint computer security facility 152 may provide threat protection ina plurality of network infrastructure locations, such as at theenterprise facility 102 network entry point, i.e. the firewall facility138 or gateway; at the server facility 142; at distribution pointswithin the network, i.e. the hubs and routers 148; at the desktop ofclient facility computers; and the like. In embodiments, the mosteffective location for threat detection may be at the user's computerdesktop endpoint computer security facility 152.

The interface between the threat management facility 100 and theenterprise facility 102, and through the appliance facility 140 toembedded endpoint computer security facilities, may include a set oftools that may be the same for all enterprise implementations, but alloweach enterprise to implement different controls. In embodiments, thesecontrols may include both automatic actions and managed actions.Automatic actions may include downloads of the endpoint computersecurity facility 152 to components of the enterprise facility 102,downloads of updates to existing endpoint computer security facilitiesof the enterprise facility 102, uploaded network interaction requestsfrom enterprise facility 102 components to the threat managementfacility 100, and the like. In embodiments, automatic interactionsbetween the enterprise facility 102 and the threat management facility100 may be configured by the threat management facility 100 and anadministration facility 134 in the enterprise facility 102. Theadministration facility 134 may configure policy rules that determineinteractions, such as developing rules for accessing applications, as inwho is authorized and when applications may be used; establishing rulesfor ethical behavior and activities; rules governing the use ofentertainment software such as games, or personal use software such asIM and VoIP; rules for determining access to enterprise facility 102computing resources, including authentication, levels of access, riskassessment, and usage history tracking; rules for when an action is notallowed, such as whether an action is completely deigned or justmodified in its execution; and the like. The administration facility 134may also establish license management, which in turn may furtherdetermine interactions associated with a licensed application. Inembodiments, interactions between the threat management facility 100 andthe enterprise facility 102 may provide threat protection to theenterprise facility 102 by managing the flow of network data into andout of the enterprise facility 102 through automatic actions that may beconfigured by the threat management facility 100 or the administrationfacility 134.

Client facilities within the enterprise facility 102 may be connected tothe enterprise facility 102 network by way of wired network facilities148A or wireless network facilities 148B. Client facilities connected tothe enterprise facility 102 network via a wired facility 148A orwireless facility 148B may receive similar protection, as bothconnection types are ultimately connected to the same enterprisefacility 102 network, with the same endpoint computer security facility152, and the same threat protected enterprise facility 102 environment.Mobile wireless facility clients 144B-F, because of their ability toconnect to any wireless 148B,D network access point, may connect to theInternet 154 outside the enterprise facility 102, and therefore outsidethe threat-protected environment of the enterprise facility 102. In thisinstance the mobile client facility (e.g., the clients 144 B-F), if notfor the presence of the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayexperience a malware attack or perform actions counter to enterprisefacility 102 established policies. In addition, there may be a pluralityof ways for the threat management facility 100 to protect theout-of-enterprise facility 102 mobile client facility (e.g., the clients144 D-F) that has an embedded endpoint computer security facility 152,such as by providing URI filtering in personal routers, using a webappliance as a DNS proxy, or the like. Mobile client facilities that arecomponents of the enterprise facility 102 but temporarily outsideconnectivity with the enterprise facility 102 network may be providedwith the same threat protection and policy control as client facilitiesinside the enterprise facility 102. In addition, mobile the clientfacilities may receive the same interactions to and from the threatmanagement facility 100 as client facilities inside the enterprisefacility 102, where the mobile client facilities may be considered avirtual extension of the enterprise facility 102, receiving all the sameservices via their embedded endpoint computer security facility 152.

Interactions between the threat management facility 100 and thecomponents of the enterprise facility 102, including mobile clientfacility extensions of the enterprise facility 102, may ultimately beconnected through the Internet 154. Threat management facility 100downloads and upgrades to the enterprise facility 102 may be passed fromthe firewalled networks of the threat management facility 100 through tothe endpoint computer security facility 152 equipped components of theenterprise facility 102. In turn the endpoint computer security facility152 components of the enterprise facility 102 may upload policy andaccess requests back across the Internet 154 and through to the threatmanagement facility 100. The Internet 154 however, is also the paththrough which threats may be transmitted from their source. Thesenetwork threats 104 may include threats from a plurality of sources,including without limitation, websites, e-mail, IM, VoIP, applicationsoftware, and the like. These threats may attempt to attack a mobileenterprise client facility (e.g., the clients 144B-F) equipped with anendpoint computer security facility 152, but in embodiments, as long asthe mobile client facility is embedded with an endpoint computersecurity facility 152, as described above, threats may have no bettersuccess than if the mobile client facility were inside the enterprisefacility 102.

However, if the mobile client facility were to attempt to connect intoan unprotected connection point, such as at a secondary location 108that is not a part of the enterprise facility 102, the mobile clientfacility may be required to request network interactions through thethreat management facility 100, where contacting the threat managementfacility 100 may be performed prior to any other network action. Inembodiments, the client facility's 144 endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may manage actions in unprotected network environments suchas when the client facility (e.g., client 144F) is in a secondarylocation 108 or connecting wirelessly to a non-enterprise facility 102wireless Internet connection, where the endpoint computer securityfacility 152 may dictate what actions are allowed, blocked, modified, orthe like. For instance, if the client facility's 144 endpoint computersecurity facility 152 is unable to establish a secured connection to thethreat management facility 100, the endpoint computer security facility152 may inform the user of such, and recommend that the connection notbe made. In the instance when the user chooses to connect despite therecommendation, the endpoint computer security facility 152 may performspecific actions during or after the unprotected connection is made,including running scans during the connection period, running scansafter the connection is terminated, storing interactions for subsequentthreat and policy evaluation, contacting the threat management facility100 upon first instance of a secured connection for further actions andor scanning, restricting access to network and local resources, or thelike. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayperform specific actions to remediate possible threat incursions orpolicy violations during or after the unprotected connection.

The secondary location 108 may have no endpoint computer securityfacilities 152 as a part of its computer components, such as itsfirewalls 138B, servers 142B, clients 144G, hubs and routers 148C-D, andthe like. As a result, the computer components of the secondary location108 may be open to threat attacks, and become potential sources ofthreats, as well as any mobile enterprise facility clients 144B-F thatmay be connected to the secondary location's 108 network. In thisinstance, these computer components may now unknowingly spread a threatto other components connected to the network.

Some threats may not come directly from the Internet 154, such as fromnon-enterprise facility controlled mobile devices that are physicallybrought into the enterprise facility 102 and connected to the enterprisefacility 102 client facilities. The connection may be made from directconnection with the enterprise facility's 102 client facility, such asthrough a USB port, or in physical proximity with the enterprisefacility's 102 client facility such that a wireless facility connectioncan be established, such as through a Bluetooth connection. Thesephysical proximity threats 110 may be another mobile computing device, aportable memory storage device, a mobile communications device, or thelike, such as CDs and DVDs, memory sticks, flash drives, external harddrives, cell phones, PDAs, MP3 players, digital cameras, point-to-pointdevices, digital picture frames, digital pens, navigation devices,tablets, appliances, and the like. A physical proximity threat 110 mayhave been previously infiltrated by network threats while connected toan unprotected network connection outside the enterprise facility 102,and when connected to the enterprise facility 102 client facility, posea threat. Because of their mobile nature, physical proximity threats 110may infiltrate computing resources in any location, such as beingphysically brought into the enterprise facility 102 site, connected toan enterprise facility 102 client facility while that client facility ismobile, plugged into an unprotected client facility at a secondarylocation 108, and the like. A mobile device, once connected to anunprotected computer resource, may become a physical proximity threat110. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 mayprovide enterprise facility 102 computing resources with threatprotection against physical proximity threats 110, for instance, throughscanning the device prior to allowing data transfers, through securityvalidation certificates, through establishing a safe zone within theenterprise facility 102 computing resource to transfer data into forevaluation, and the like.

Having provided an overall context for threat detection, the descriptionnow turns to a brief discussion of an example of a computer system thatmay be used for any of the entities and facilities described above.

FIG. 2 illustrates a computer system. In general, the computer system200 may include a computing device 210 connected to a network 202, e.g.,through an external device 204. The computing device 210 may be orinclude any type of network endpoint or endpoints as described herein,e.g., with reference to FIG. 1 above. For example, the computing device210 may include a desktop computer workstation. The computing device 210may also or instead be any suitable device that has processes andcommunicates over a network 202, including without limitation a laptopcomputer, a desktop computer, a personal digital assistant, a tablet, amobile phone, a television, a set top box, a wearable computer (e.g.,watch, jewelry, or clothing), a home device (e.g., a thermostat or ahome appliance controller), just as some examples. The computing device210 may also or instead include a server, or it may be disposed on aserver.

The computing device 210 may be used for any of the entities describedin the threat management environment described above with reference toFIG. 1. For example, the computing device 210 may be a server, a clientan enterprise facility, a threat management facility, or any of theother facilities or computing devices described therein. In certainaspects, the computing device 210 may be implemented using hardware or acombination of software and hardware, and the computing device 210 maybe a standalone device, a device integrated into another entity ordevice, a platform distributed across multiple entities, or avirtualized device executing in a virtualization environment.

The network 202 may include any network described above, e.g., datanetwork(s) or internetwork(s) suitable for communicating data andcontrol information among participants in the computer system 200. Thismay include public networks such as the Internet, private networks, andtelecommunications networks such as the Public Switched TelephoneNetwork or cellular networks using third generation cellular technology(e.g., 3G or IMT-2000), fourth generation cellular technology (e.g., 4G,LTE. MT-Advanced, E-UTRA, etc.) or WiMax-Advanced (IEEE 802.16m)) and/orother technologies, as well as any of a variety of corporate area,metropolitan area, campus or other local area networks or enterprisenetworks, along with any switches, routers, hubs, gateways, and the likethat might be used to carry data among participants in the computersystem 200. The network 202 may also include a combination of datanetworks, and need not be limited to a strictly public or privatenetwork.

The external device 204 may be any computer or other remote resourcethat connects to the computing device 210 through the network 202. Thismay include threat management resources such as any of thosecontemplated above, gateways or other network devices, remote servers orthe like containing content requested by the computing device 210, anetwork storage device or resource, a device hosting malicious content,or any other resource or device that might connect to the computingdevice 210 through the network 202.

The computing device 210 may include a processor 212, a memory 214, anetwork interface 216, a data store 218, and one or more input/outputdevices 220. The computing device 210 may further include or be incommunication with peripherals 222 and other external input/outputdevices 224.

The processor 212 may be any as described herein, and in general becapable of processing instructions for execution within the computingdevice 210 or computer system 200. The processor 212 may include asingle-threaded processor or a multi-threaded processor. The processor212 may be capable of processing instructions stored in the memory 214or on the data store 218.

The memory 214 may store information within the computing device 210 orcomputer system 200. The memory 214 may include any volatile ornon-volatile memory or other computer-readable medium, including withoutlimitation a Random Access Memory (RAM), a flash memory, a Read OnlyMemory (ROM), a Programmable Read-only Memory (PROM), an Erasable PROM(EPROM), registers, and so forth. The memory 214 may store programinstructions, program data, executables, and other software and datauseful for controlling operation of the computing device 200 andconfiguring the computing device 200 to perform functions for a user.The memory 214 may include a number of different stages and types fordifferent aspects of operation of the computing device 210. For example,a processor may include on-board memory and/or cache for faster accessto certain data or instructions, and a separate, main memory or the likemay be included to expand memory capacity as desired.

The memory 214 may, in general, include a non-volatile computer readablemedium containing computer code that, when executed by the computingdevice 200 creates an execution environment for a computer program inquestion, e.g., code that constitutes processor firmware, a protocolstack, a database management system, an operating system, or acombination of the foregoing, and that performs some or all of the stepsset forth in the various flow charts and other algorithmic descriptionsset forth herein. While a single memory 214 is depicted, it will beunderstood that any number of memories may be usefully incorporated intothe computing device 210. For example, a first memory may providenon-volatile storage such as a disk drive for permanent or long-termstorage of files and code even when the computing device 210 is powereddown. A second memory such as a random access memory may providevolatile (but higher speed) memory for storing instructions and data forexecuting processes. A third memory may be used to improve performanceby providing even higher speed memory physically adjacent to theprocessor 212 for registers, caching and so forth.

The network interface 216 may include any hardware and/or software forconnecting the computing device 210 in a communicating relationship withother resources through the network 202. This may include remoteresources accessible through the Internet, as well as local resourcesavailable using short range communications protocols using, e.g.,physical connections (e.g., Ethernet), radio frequency communications(e.g., WiFi), optical communications, (e.g., fiber optics, infrared, orthe like), ultrasonic communications, or any combination of these orother media that might be used to carry data between the computingdevice 210 and other devices. The network interface 216 may, forexample, include a router, a modem, a network card, an infraredtransceiver, a radio frequency (RF) transceiver, a near fieldcommunications interface, a radio-frequency identification (RFID) tagreader, or any other data reading or writing resource or the like.

More generally, the network interface 216 may include any combination ofhardware and software suitable for coupling the components of thecomputing device 210 to other computing or communications resources. Byway of example and not limitation, this may include electronics for awired or wireless Ethernet connection operating according to the IEEE802.11 standard (or any variation thereof), or any other short or longrange wireless networking components or the like. This may includehardware for short range data communications such as Bluetooth or aninfrared transceiver, which may be used to couple to other localdevices, or to connect to a local area network or the like that is inturn coupled to a data network 202 such as the Internet. This may alsoor instead include hardware/software for a WiMax connection or acellular network connection (using, e.g., CDMA, GSM, LTE, or any othersuitable protocol or combination of protocols). The network interface216 may be included as part of the input/output devices 220 orvice-versa.

The data store 218 may be any internal memory store providing acomputer-readable medium such as a disk drive, an optical drive, amagnetic drive, a flash drive, or other device capable of providing massstorage for the computing device 210. The data store 218 may storecomputer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, andother data for the computing device 210 or computer system 200 in anon-volatile form for subsequent retrieval and use. For example, thedata store 218 may store without limitation one or more of the operatingsystem, application programs, program data, databases, files, and otherprogram modules or other software objects and the like.

The input/output interface 220 may support input from and output toother devices that might couple to the computing device 210. This may,for example, include serial ports (e.g., RS-232 ports), universal serialbus (USB) ports, optical ports, Ethernet ports, telephone ports, audiojacks, component audio/video inputs, HDMI ports, and so forth, any ofwhich might be used to form wired connections to other local devices.This may also or instead include an infrared interface, RF interface,magnetic card reader, or other input/output system for coupling in acommunicating relationship with other local devices. It will beunderstood that, while the network interface 216 for networkcommunications is described separately from the input/output interface220 for local device communications, these two interfaces may be thesame, or may share functionality, such as where a USB port is used toattach to a WiFi accessory, or where an Ethernet connection is used tocouple to a local network attached storage.

A peripheral 222 may include any device used to provide information toor receive information from the computing device 200. This may includehuman input/output (I/O) devices such as a keyboard, a mouse, a mousepad, a track ball, a joystick, a microphone, a foot pedal, a camera, atouch screen, a scanner, or other device that might be employed by theuser 230 to provide input to the computing device 210. This may also orinstead include a display, a speaker, a printer, a projector, a headsetor any other audiovisual device for presenting information to a user.The peripheral 222 may also or instead include a digital signalprocessing device, an actuator, or other device to support control orcommunication to other devices or components. Other I/O devices suitablefor use as a peripheral 222 include haptic devices, three-dimensionalrendering systems, augmented-reality displays, and so forth. In oneaspect, the peripheral 222 may serve as the network interface 216, suchas with a USB device configured to provide communications via shortrange (e.g., BlueTooth, WiFi, Infrared, RF, or the like) or long range(e.g., cellular data or WiMax) communications protocols. In anotheraspect, the peripheral 222 may provide a device to augment operation ofthe computing device 210, such as a global positioning system (GPS)device, a security dongle, or the like. In another aspect, theperipheral may be a storage device such as a flash card, USB drive, orother solid state device, or an optical drive, a magnetic drive, a diskdrive, or other device or combination of devices suitable for bulkstorage. More generally, any device or combination of devices suitablefor use with the computing device 200 may be used as a peripheral 222 ascontemplated herein.

Other hardware 226 may be incorporated into the computing device 200such as a co-processor, a digital signal processing system, a mathco-processor, a graphics engine, a video driver, and so forth. The otherhardware 226 may also or instead include expanded input/output ports,extra memory, additional drives (e.g., a DVD drive or other accessory),and so forth.

A bus 232 or combination of busses may serve as an electromechanicalplatform for interconnecting components of the computing device 200 suchas the processor 212, memory 214, network interface 216, other hardware226, data store 218, and input/output interface. As shown in the figure,each of the components of the computing device 210 may be interconnectedusing a system bus 232 or other communication mechanism forcommunicating information.

Methods and systems described herein can be realized using the processor212 of the computer system 200 to execute one or more sequences ofinstructions contained in the memory 214 to perform predetermined tasks.In embodiments, the computing device 200 may be deployed as a number ofparallel processors synchronized to execute code together for improvedperformance, or the computing device 200 may be realized in avirtualized environment where software on a hypervisor or othervirtualization management facility emulates components of the computingdevice 200 as appropriate to reproduce some or all of the functions of ahardware instantiation of the computing device 200.

FIG. 3 illustrates a threat management system according to someimplementations. In general, the system 300 may include an endpoint 302,a firewall 304, a server 306, and a threat management facility 308coupled to one another directly or indirectly through a data network305, all as generally described above.

Each of the entities depicted in FIG. 3 may, for example, be implementedon one or more computing devices such as the computing device describedabove with reference to FIG. 2. A number of systems may be distributedacross these various components to support threat detection, such as acoloring system 310, a key management system 312 and an endpoint healthsystem 314, each of which may include software components executing onany of the foregoing system components, and each of which maycommunicate with the threat management facility 308 and an endpointthreat detection agent 320 executing on the endpoint 302 to supportimproved threat detection and remediation.

The coloring system 310 may be used to label or ‘color’ software objectsfor improved tracking and detection of potentially harmful activity. Thecoloring system 310 may, for example, label files, executables,processes, network communications, data sources, and so forth. A varietyof techniques may be used to select static and/or dynamic labels for anyof these various software objects, and to manage the mechanics ofapplying and propagating coloring information as appropriate. Forexample, a process may inherit a color from an application that launchesthe process. Similarly and file may inherit a color from a process whenit is created or opened by a process, and/or a process may inherit acolor from a file that the process has opened. More generally, any typeof labeling, as well as rules for propagating, inheriting, changing, orotherwise manipulating such labels, may be used by the coloring system310 as contemplated herein. A suitable coloring system is described ingreater detail below with reference to FIG. 4.

The key management system 312 may support management of keys for theendpoint 302 in order to selectively permit or prevent access to contenton the endpoint 302 on a file-specific basis, a process-specific basis,an application-specific basis, a user-specific basis, or any othersuitable basis in order to prevent data leakage, and in order to supportmore fine-grained and immediate control over access to content on theendpoint 302 when a security compromise is detected. Thus for example,if a particular process executing on the endpoint is compromised, orpotentially compromised or otherwise under suspicion, access by thatprocess may be blocked (e.g., with access to keys revoked) in order toprevent, e.g., data leakage or other malicious activity. A suitable keymanagement system useful in this context is described in greater detailbelow with reference to FIG. 5.

The endpoint health system 314 may be used to provide periodic oraperiodic information from the endpoint 302 or other system componentsabout system health, security, status, and so forth. The endpoint healthsystem 314 may thus in general include a health status report system forthe endpoint 302, such as through the use of a heartbeat system or thelike. A heartbeat may be encrypted or plaintext, or some combination ofthese, and may be communicated unidirectionally (e.g., from the endpoint308 to the threat management facility 308) or bidirectionally (e.g.,between the endpoint 302 and the server 306, or any other pair of systemcomponents) on any useful schedule. A suitable heartbeat system that canbe used as part of the endpoint health system 314 is described ingreater detail below with reference to FIG. 6.

In general, these various monitoring and management systems maycooperate to provide improved threat detection and response. Forexample, the coloring system 310 may be used to evaluate when aparticular process is potentially opening inappropriate files, and apotential threat may be confirmed based on an interrupted heartbeat fromthe endpoint health system 314. The key management system 312 may thenbe deployed to revoke access by the process to certain resources (e.g.,keys or file) so that no further files can be opened, deleted orotherwise modified. More generally, the cooperation of these systemsenables a wide variety of reactive measures that can improve detectionand remediation of potential threats to an endpoint.

FIG. 4 illustrates a system for behavioral tracking, coloring, andgeneration of indications of compromise (IOCs). In general, the system400 may include a number of entities participating in a threatmanagement process such as any of the entities and threat managementprocesses described herein. The threat management process may forexample employ techniques such as behavioral tracking, encryption,endpoint recording, reputation-based threat detection, behavioral-basedthreat detection, signature-based threat detection, and combinations ofthe foregoing, or any other suitable techniques for detecting threats toendpoints in an enterprise.

In general, the system 400 may include a number of endpoints 402, 412and a threat management facility 404 in an enterprise 410, such as anyof the enterprises described herein. An external analysis facility 406may analyze threat data and provide rules and the like for use by thethreat management facility 404 and endpoints 402, 412 in managingthreats to the enterprise 410. The threat management facility 404 mayreside in locally (e.g., a part of, embedded within, or locally coupledto the endpoint 402), a virtual appliance (e.g., which could be run by aprotected set of systems on their own network systems), a private cloud,a public cloud, and so forth. The analysis facility 406 may storelocally-derived threat information. The analysis facility 406 may alsoor instead receive threat information from a third party source 416 suchas MITRE Corporation or any other public, private, educational or otherorganization that gathers information on network threats and providesanalysis and threat detection information for use by others. Each ofthese components may be configured with suitable programming toparticipate in the various threat detection and management techniquescontemplated herein. The threat management facility 404 may monitor anystream of data from an endpoint 402 exclusively, or use the full contextof intelligence from the stream of all protected endpoints 402, 412 orsome combination of these.

The endpoint 402 may be any of the endpoints described herein, or anyother device or network asset that might join or participate in theenterprise 410 or otherwise operate on an enterprise network. This may,for example, include a server, a client such as a desktop computer or amobile computing device (e.g., a laptop computer or a tablet), acellular phone, a smart phone, or other computing device suitable forparticipating in the enterprise 410.

In general, the endpoint 402 may include any number of computing objectssuch as an object 418 labeled with a descriptor 420. While the termobject has a number of specific meanings in the art, and in particularin object-oriented programming, it will be understood that the term‘object’ as used herein is intended to be significantly broader, and mayinclude any data, process, file or combination of these includingwithout limitation any process, application, executable, script, dynamiclinked library, file, data, database, data source, data structure,function, resource locator (e.g., uniform resource locator (URL) orother uniform resource identifier (URI)), or the like that might bemanipulated by one of the computing devices described herein.

An object 418 may also or instead include a remote resource, such as aresource identified in a URL. That is, while the objects 418 in FIG. 4are depicted as residing on the endpoint 402, an object 418 may alsoreside elsewhere in the system 400, while still being labeled with adescriptor 420 and tracked by the monitor 421 of the endpoint 402. Theobject 418 may be an item that is performing an action or causing anevent, or the object 418 may be an item that is receiving the action orresult of an event (i.e., the item in the system 400 being acted upon).

Where the object 418 is data or includes data, the object 418 may beencrypted or otherwise protected, or the object 418 may be unencryptedor otherwise unprotected. The object 418 may be a process or othercomputing object that performs an action, which may include a singleevent or a collection or sequence of events taken by a process. Theobject 418 may also or instead include an item such as a file or linesof code that are executable to perform such actions. The object 418 mayalso or instead include a computing component upon which an action istaken, e.g., a system setting (e.g., a registry key or the like), a datafile, a URL, or the like. The object 418 may exhibit a behavior such asan interaction with another object or component of the system 400.

In one aspect, objects 418 may be described in terms of persistence. Theobject 418 may, for example, be a part of a process, and remainpersistent as long as that process is alive. The object 418 may insteadbe persistent across an endpoint 402 and remain persistent as long as anendpoint 402 is active or alive. The object 418 may instead be a globalobject having persistence outside of an endpoint 418, such as a URL or adata store. In other words, the object 418 may be a persistent objectwith persistence outside of the endpoint.

Although many if not most objects 418 will typically be benign objectsforming a part of a normal, operating endpoint, an object 418 maycontain software associated with an advanced persistent threat (APT) orother malware that resides partially or entirely on the endpoint 402.The associated software may have reached the endpoint 402 in a varietyof ways, and may have been placed manually or automatically on theendpoint 402 by a malicious source. It will be understood that theassociated software may take any number of forms and have any number ofcomponents. For example, the associated software may include anexecutable file that can execute independently, or the associatedsoftware may be a macro, plug-in, or the like that executes withinanother application. Similarly, the associated software may manifest asone or more processes or threads executing on the endpoint 402. Further,the associated software may install from a file on the endpoint 402 (ora file remote from the endpoint 402), and the associated software maycreate one or more files such as data files or the like while executing.Associated software should be understood to generally include all suchfiles and processes except where a specific file or process is morespecifically noted.

A threat such as an APT may also take the form of an attack where noaltered or additional software is directly added or modified on theendpoint 402. Instead, an adversary may reuse existing software on thesystem 400 to perform the attacks. It is for this reason that simplyscanning for associated software may be insufficient for the detectionof APTs and it may be preferable to detect APTs based on the behavior ofthe software and associated objects 418 that are used by, for, and withthat software.

An object coloring system 414 may apply descriptors 420 to objects 418on the endpoint 402. This may be performed continuously by a backgroundprocess on the endpoint 402, or it may occur whenever an object 418 isinvolved in an action, such as when a process makes a call to anapplication programming interface (API) or takes some other action, orwhen a URL is used to initiate a network request, or when a read or awrite is performed on data in a file. This may also or instead include acombination of these approaches as well as other approaches, such as bypre-labeling a file or application when it is moved to the endpoint 402,or when the endpoint 402 is started up or instantiated. In general, theobject coloring system 414 may add, remove or change a color at anylocation and at any moment that can be practicably instrumented on acomputer system.

As noted above, the term ‘object’ as used herein is intended to includea wide range of computing objects and as such, the manner in whichparticular objects 418 are labeled or ‘colored’ with descriptors 420 mayvary significantly. Any object 418 that is performing an action may becolored at the time of and/or with a label corresponding to the action,or likewise any object 418 that is the target of the action may becolored at the time that it is used and/or with a label corresponding toa process or the like using the object 418. Furthermore, the operatingsystem runtime representation of the object 418 may be colored, or thepersistent object outside of the operating system may be colored (as isthe case for a File Handle or File Object within the operating system orthe actual file as stored in a file system), such as within anencryption header or other header applied to the file, or as part of adirectory attribute or any other persistent location within the file orfile system. A former coloring may be ephemerally tracked while theoperating system maintains the representation and the latter may persistlong after any reboots of the same operating system and likewise havemeaning when read or used by other endpoints 402. For processes, eachfile handle may be supplemented with a pointer or other mechanism forlocating a descriptor 420 for a particular object 420 that is a process.More specifically, each object 418 may be colored in any manner suitablefor appending information to that object 418 so that the correspondingdescriptor 420 can be retrieved and, where appropriate, updated.

The coloring system 414 may apply any suitable rules for adding andchanging descriptors 420 for objects 418. For example, when a processwith a certain descriptor accesses data with a different descriptor, thedescriptor for the process may be updated to correspond to the data, orthe descriptor for the data may be updated to correspond to the process,or some combination of these. Any action by or upon an object 418 maytrigger a coloring rule so that descriptors 420 can be revised at anyrelevant time(s) during processing.

A descriptor 420 may take a variety of forms, and may in general includeany information selected for relevance to threat detection. This may,for example, be a simple categorization of data or processes such astrusted or untrusted. For example, in one embodiment described herein,data and processes are labeled as either ‘IN’ (e.g., trusted) or ‘OUT’(e.g., untrusted). The specific content of the label is unimportant, andthis may be a binary flag, text string, encrypted data or otherhuman-readable and/or machine-readable identifier, provided that thedescriptor 420 can facilitate discrimination among labeled files—in thisexample, between trusted objects 418 and untrusted objects 418 so that,e.g., trusted data can be selectively decrypted or encrypted for usewith trusted processes. Similarly, data may be labeled as corporate dataor private data, with similar type-dependent processing provided. Forexample, private data may be encrypted with a key exclusively controlledby the data owner, while corporate data may be encrypted using aremotely managed key ring for an enterprise operated by the corporation.

In another aspect, the descriptor 420 may provide a multi-tiered orhierarchical description of the object 418 including any informationuseful for characterizing the object 418 in a threat management context.For example, in one useful configuration the descriptor 420 may includea type or category, static threat detection attributes, and an explicitidentification. The type or category for the object 418 may be anycategory or the like that characterizes a general nature or use of theobject 418 as inferred from behavior and other characteristics. Thismay, for example, include categories such as ‘game,’ ‘financial,’‘application,’ ‘electronic mail,’ ‘image,’ ‘video,’ ‘browser,’‘antivirus,’ and so forth. The category may be more granular, or mayinclude hierarchical categories such as ‘application:spreadsheet,’‘application:word_processing,’ and so forth. Such colors may be directlyinferred from a single action, a sequence of actions, or a combinationof actions and other colors, including, e.g., colors of processes andfiles related to a particular action, or other objects 418 that providecontext for a particular action or group of actions. One or more colorsmay also or instead be explicitly provided by a user or a process, orotherwise automatically or manually attributed to computer objects ascontemplated herein.

The static threat detection attributes may be any readily ascertainablecharacteristics of the object 418 useful in threat detection. This may,for example, include an antivirus signature, a hash, a file size, fileprivileges, a process user, a path or directory, declarations ofpermissions, an access (e.g., a resource access, or an API access), andso forth. Static threat detection attributes may also include attributesthat are derived by or supplied from other sources. For example, staticthreat detection attributes may include a reputation for an object 418,which may be expressed in any suitable or useful level of granularitysuch as with discrete categories (trusted/untrusted/unknown) or with anumerical score or other quantitative indicator. The explicitidentification may, in general, be what an object 418 calls itself,e.g., a file name or process name.

Some actions may transfer colors from a subject of the action to thetarget of the action. For example, when a process creates sub-processes,the sub-processes may inherit the colors of its parent(s). By way ofanother example, when a process is initially loaded from an executable,it may inherit the color(s) stored in the file system for or with theexecutable.

In general, the descriptor 420 may be provided in any suitable format.The descriptor 420 may for example be formed as a vector of binary flagsor other attributes that form the ‘color’ or description of an object418. The descriptor 420 may also, where appropriate, include scalarquantities for certain properties. For example, it may be relevant howmany times a system file was accessed, how many file handles a processhas open, how many times a remote resource was requested or how long aremote resource is connected, and this information may be suitablyencoded in the descriptor 420 for use in coloring objects with thecoloring system 414 and applying rules for IOC detection by the IOCmonitor 421.

An indication of compromise (IOC) monitor 421 may be provided toinstrument the endpoint 402 so that any observable actions by orinvolving various objects 418 can be detected. As with the coloringsystem 414, it will be understood that the types of observable actionswill vary significantly, and the manner in which the endpoint 402 isinstrumented to detect such actions will depend on the particular typeof object 418. For example, for files or the like, an API for a filesystem may be used to detect reads, writes, and other access (e.g.,open, read, write, move, copy, delete, etc.), and may be configured toreport to or otherwise initiate monitoring of the action taken with thefile through the file system. As another example, kernel objects may beinstrumented at the corresponding object handle or in some other manner.As a further example, a kernel driver may be used for intercepting aprocess startup. While a wide variety of objects are contemplatedherein, one of ordinary skill in the art may readily create suitableinstrumentation for any computing object so that it may be monitored bythe IOC monitor 421.

It will be noted that suitable instrumentation may be coded for avariety of functions and circumstances. For example, instrumentation mayusefully track requests for network access or other actions back to aparticular application or process, or data payloads back to a particularfile or data location. One of ordinary skill in the art can readilyimplement suitable traces and/or logging for any such information thatmight be useful in a particular IOC monitoring operation.

In general, the IOC monitor 421 applies rules to determine when there isan IOC 422 suitable for reporting to a threat management facility 404.It will be understood that an endpoint 402 may, in suitablecircumstances and with appropriate information, take immediate localaction to remediate a threat. However, the monitor 421 mayadvantageously accumulate a sequence of actions, and still moreadvantageously may identify inconsistencies or unexpected behaviorwithin a group of actions with improved sensitivity by comparingdescriptors 420 for various objects 418 involved in relevant actions andevents. In this manner, rules may be applied based upon the descriptors420 that better discriminate malicious activity while reducing thequantity and frequency of information that must be communicated to aremote threat management facility 404. At the same time, all of therelevant information provided by the descriptors 420 can be sent in anIOC 422 when communicating a potential issue to the threat managementfacility 404. For example, during the course of execution, a specificprocess (as evidenced by its observed actions) may be assigned colordescriptors indicating that it is a browser process. Further, thespecific process may be assigned an attribute indicating that it hasexposed itself to external URLs or other external data. Subsequently,the same process may be observed to be taking an action suitable for aninternal or system process, such as opening up shared memory to anotherprocess that has coloring descriptions indicating that it is a systemprocess. When this last action is observed, an inconsistency in thevarious color descriptors between the subject of the action—theexternally exposed browser process—and the target of the action mayresult in a well-defined IOC, which may be directly processed withimmediate local action taken. The IOC may also or instead be reportedexternally as appropriate.

Thus, an endpoint 402 in an enterprise 410 may be instrumented with acoloring system 414 and monitor 421 to better detect potentiallymalicious activity using descriptors 420 that have been selected forrelevance to threat detection along with a corresponding set of rulesdeveloped for the particular descriptors 420 that are being used tolabel or color various objects 418. By way of example, the object 418may be a web browser that starts off being colored as a ‘browser’ and an‘internet facing’ application. Based on this descriptor 420, a range ofbehaviors or actions may be considered normal, such as accessing remotenetwork resources. However, if an object 418 colored with thisdescriptor 420 attempted to elevate privileges for a process, or toaccess a registry or system files, then this inconsistency in action maytrigger a rule violation and result in an IOC 422.

In general, any action or series of actions that cumulatively invoke aparticular reporting or action rule may be combined into an IOC 422 andcommunicated to the threat management facility 404. For example, an IOC422 may include a malicious or strange behavior, or an indication of amalicious or strange behavior. The IOC 422 may be a normalized IOC thatexpresses one or more actions in a platform independent manner. That is,the IOC 422 may express a malicious behavior or suspected maliciousbehavior without reference to platform-specific information such asdetails of an operating system (e.g., iOS, MacOS, Windows, Android,Linux, and so forth), hardware, applications, naming conventions, and soforth. Thus, a normalized IOC may be suitable for identifying aparticular threat across multiple platforms, and may include platformindependent processes, actions, or behaviors, or may express suchprocess, actions, or behaviors in a platform independent manner. Thenormalized IOC may be generated from the IOC 422, e.g., it may be aconverted version of the IOC 422 suitable for use with multipleplatforms, or it may simply be any IOC 422 that has been created in aplatform independent form. Process colorization (i.e., using thecoloring system 414) as described herein may be used to create anormalized IOC.

In general, a threat management facility 404 for the enterprise 410 mayinclude an IOC collector 426 that receives the IOC 422 from the endpoint402 and determines an appropriate action. This may include any suitableremedial action, or where one or more IOCs 422 are inconclusive,continued monitoring or increased monitoring as appropriate.

The threat management facility 404 may provide a variety of threatmanagement or monitoring tools 424, any of which may be deployed inresponse IOCs 422 collected by the IOC collector 426. These tools 424may include without limitation a scanning engine,whitelisting/blacklisting, reputation analysis, web filtering, anemulator, protection architecture, live protection, runtime detection,APT detection, network antivirus products, IOC detection, access logs, aheartbeat, a sandbox or quarantine system, and so forth.

The analysis facility 406 may provide a remote processing resource foranalyzing malicious activities and creating rules 434 suitable fordetecting IOCs 422 based on objects 420 and descriptors 420. It isgenerally contemplated that suitable attributes of certain descriptors418 and one or more rules 434 may be developed together so that objects418 can be appropriately labeled with descriptors 420 that permitinvocation of rules 434 and creation of IOCs 422 at appropriate times.The analysis facility 406 may include a variety of analysis tools 428including, without limitation, tools for regular expression,whitelisting/blacklisting, crowd sourcing, identifiers, and so forth.The analysis tools 428 may also or instead include information and toolssuch as URL look-ups, genotypes, identities, file look-up, reputations,and so forth. The analysis facility 406 may also provide numerousrelated functions such as an interface for receiving information on new,unknown files or processes, and for testing of such code or content in asandbox on the analysis facility 406.

The analysis facility 406 may also or instead include a compromisedetector 430, where the compromise detector 430 is configured to receivenew threat information for analysis and creation of new rules anddescriptors as appropriate, as well as corresponding remedial actions.The compromise detector 430 may include any tools described herein orotherwise known in the art for detecting compromises or evaluating newthreats in an enterprise 410.

In general, a rule 434 may be manually created with correspondinghuman-readable semantics, e.g., where a process is labeled as a browserprocess or other category or type that can be interpreted by a human. Itshould, however, be appreciated that the compromise detector 430 mayalso be configured to automatically generate descriptors 420 and rules434 suitable for distribution to a threat management facility 404 and anendpoint 402. In this latter mode, the meaning of a particulardescriptor 420 may not have a readily expressible human-readablemeaning. Thus, it will be understood that attributes selected forrelevance to threat detection may include conventional attributes, aswell as attributes without conventional labels or meaning except in thecontext of a particular, computer-generated rule for threat detection.

In general, the analysis facility 406 may be within an enterprise 410,or the analysis facility 406 may be external to the enterprise 410 andadministered, for example, by a trusted third party. Further, athird-party source 416 may provide additional threat data 438 oranalyses for use by the analysis facility 406 and the threat managementfacility 404. The third-party resource 416 may be a data resource thatprovides threat data 438 and analyses, where the threat data 438 is anydata that is useful in detecting, monitoring, or analyzing threats. Forexample, the threat data 438 may include a database of threats,signatures, and the like. By way of example, the third-party resource416 may be a resource provided by The MITRE Corporation.

The system 400 may include a reputation engine 440 storing a pluralityof reputations 442. The reputation engine 440 may include a reputationmanagement system for the generation, analysis, identification, editing,storing, etc., of reputations 442. The reputation engine 440 may includereputation-based filtering, which may be similar to the reputationfiltering discussed above with reference to FIG. 1. The reputationengine 440 may be located on the threat management facility 404 or theendpoint 402 as shown in FIG. 4, or the reputation engine 440 may belocated elsewhere in the system 400. The reputation engine 440 mayreceive an IOC 422 or a stream of IOCs 422, and may generate or utilizereputations 442 for the IOCs 422. The reputation engine 440 may also orinstead receive actions, behaviors, events, interactions, and so forth,and may generate or utilize reputations 442 for any of the foregoing.The reputation engine 440 may generate or revise a reputation 442 basedon behaviors, actions, events, interactions, IOCs 422, other reputations442, a history of events, data, rules, state of encryption, colors, andso forth. The reputation engine 440 may utilize a third-party resource,e.g., for the third-party resource's reputation data.

The reputations 442 may include reputations for any of the objects 418as described herein. In general, the reputations 442 may relate to thetrustworthiness of the objects 418 or an attribute thereof (e.g., thesource of the object 418, a behavior of the object 418, another objectinteracting with the object 418, and so forth). The reputations 442 mayinclude lists of known sources of malware or known suspicious objects418. The reputations 442 may also or instead include lists of known safeor trusted resources or objects 418. The reputations 442 may be storedin a reputations database included on the reputation engine 440 orlocated elsewhere in the system 400. The reputations 442 may beexpressed in any suitable or useful level of granularity such as withdiscrete categories (e.g., trusted, untrusted, unknown, malicious, safe,etc.) or with a numerical score or other quantitative indicator. Thereputations 442 may also be scaled.

In general, in the system 400 of FIG. 4, a malicious activity on theendpoint 402 may be detected by the IOC monitor 421, and a correspondingIOC 422 may be transmitted to the threat management facility 404 forremedial action as appropriate. The threat management facility 404 mayfurther communicate one or more IOCs 422 to the analysis facility 406for additional analyses and/or resolution of inconclusive results. Otherdetails and variations are provided below. While the use of coloring andIOCs as contemplated herein can improve threat detection and remediationin a number of ways, the system 400 can be further improved withgranular control over access to endpoint data using an encryptionsystem. A system for key-based management of processes and files on anendpoint is now discussed in greater detail.

FIG. 5 illustrates a system for encryption management. Generally, thesystem 500 may include endpoints 502, an administration host 504, and athreat management facility 506, which may include policy manager 508 andkey manager 510. The system 500 may provide for the management of users512, policies 514, keys 516 (e.g., disposed on key rings 518), andendpoints 502 (e.g., from the administration host 504). The system 500may utilize various storage and processing resources, which may belocal, remote, virtual, disposed in a cloud, or the like.

The endpoints 502 may be any of the endpoints as described herein, e.g.,with reference to the other figures. The endpoints 502 may also orinstead include other end user devices and other devices to be managed.The endpoints 502 may include a web browser for use by the users 512,with supporting cryptographic functions implemented using cryptographiclibraries in the web browser. The endpoints 502 may communicate with theother components of the system 500 using any suitable communicationinterface, which may include Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption,Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), and so forth for additionalsecurity.

The endpoints 502 may include objects as described herein. For example,the endpoints 502 may include processes 520 and files 522. The processes520 may be labeled (e.g., by a coloring system using descriptors asdescribed above) in such a manner that the process is ‘IN,’ where theprocess 520 is in compliance with policies 514 administered for theendpoint 502 from a remote threat management facility 506, or theprocess is ‘OUT,’ where the process 520 is out of compliance with apolicy (or a number of policies) in the policies 514 for an enterprise.This may provide IN processes 520A and OUT processes 520B as shown inFIG. 5. The files 522 may be similarly labeled by a coloring system withdescriptors that identify each file 522 as IN, where the file 522complies with the policies 514 and is accordingly encrypted using, e.g.,a remotely managed key ring 518, or the file is OUT, where the file 522does not conform to the policies 514 and is accordingly not encryptedusing the remotely managed key ring 518. This may provide IN files 522Aand OUT files 522B as shown in FIG. 5. One skilled in the art willrecognize that other objects of the endpoint 502 or other components ofthe system 500 may be labeled in a similar manner where they are eitherIN or OUT. By coloring objects in this manner and basing key access onthe corresponding color, the “IN” software objects may operate in aprotected environment that objectively appears to be in compliance withthe policies 514. Other files and processes may still be used on theendpoint 502, but they will operate in an “OUT” or unprotectedenvironment that cannot obtain access to any of the “IN” content orfunctionality.

In an implementation, the system 500 may include determining whether anendpoint 502 is IN or OUT or whether a component of the endpoint 502 isIN or OUT, which may be based upon a set of rules (e.g., the rulesoutlined herein) or policies such as the policies 514 described herein.In some aspects, if the entire endpoint 502 is OUT—that is, out ofcompliance with one or more policies 514, the endpoint 502 will not havekey access or access to any protected content. Conversely, if theendpoint 502 is IN, the endpoint 502 may have access to protectedcontent. Thus in one aspect, the notion of IN/OUT may be applied at anendpoint level, and data protection may be a consequence of endpointprotection. Endpoint protection may also or instead be applied at a moregranular level, e.g., by determining whether executables, processes 520,files 522, etc., on the endpoint 502 are IN or OUT, which may be basedupon rules or policies 514 as described herein.

The administration host 504 may include a web browser, which may includea cryptography library 524 and a web user interface (e.g., HTML,JavaScript, etc.). An administrator may utilize the web user interfaceto administer a key management system and perform administrativefunctions such as creating and distributing keys 516, establishingsecurity policies, creating key hierarchies and rules, and so forth. Theendpoint 502 may also include a cryptographic library 524 implementingcryptographic protocols for using key material in the key ring 518 toencrypt and decrypt data as needed.

The threat management facility 506 may include any of the threatmanagement facilities or similar systems described herein. In general,the threat management facility 506 may include a policy manager 508 andkey manager 510. Alternatively, one or more of the policy manager 508and key manager 510 may be located elsewhere on a network.

The policy manager 508 may implement one or more policies 514, andmaintain, distribute, and monitor the policies for devices in anenterprise. The policies 514 may include any policies 514 relating tosecure operation of endpoints 502 in an enterprise. This may, forexample, include hardware configuration policies, software configurationpolicies, communication policies, update policies, or any other policiesrelating to, e.g., the configuration of an endpoint 502, communicationsby an endpoint 502, software executing on an endpoint 502 and so forth.Policies 514 may include usage criteria based on, e.g., signatures,indications of compromise, reputation, user identity, and so forth. Withrespect to the key management system contemplated herein, the policies514 may include a cryptographic protocol implementation, key servers,user procedures, and other relevant protocols, or these cryptographicprotocols may be provided elsewhere for use by the policy manager 508.The policies 514 may also include any rules for compliance includingthose mentioned above or any other suitable rules or algorithms that canbe applied to determine whether objects and components are ‘IN’ or ‘OUT’as contemplated herein.

The key manager 510 may be part of the threat management facility 506,or it may be remotely managed elsewhere, e.g., in a remote cloudresource or the like. The key manager 510 may also or instead bedisposed on the administration host 504 and one or more endpoints 502 ina manner independent of the threat management facility 506. In thismanner, all cryptographic operations may be isolated from the threatmanagement facility 506 and instead may be performed by a web browser orthe like executing on the administration host 504 or an endpoint 502.The key manager 510 may manage the keys 516, including managing thegeneration, exchange, storage, use, and replacement of keys 516. The keymanager 510 may include a key ring 518, where the keys 516 are disposedon the key ring 518 using one root key 526. The key manager 510 may alsoor instead include a variety of key management and other secureprocesses, including without limitation, administrator registration,establishing trust to endpoints 502, key distribution to endpoints 502,policy deployment, endpoint status reporting, and local key backup.

The users 512 may have full access to encrypted data. Alternatively, theusers 512 may have limited access to encrypted data, or no access toencrypted data. Access may be limited to users 512 using endpoints 502that are deemed ‘IN’ by the system, as well as to processes 520 that areIN, as further described herein.

The keys 516 may include cryptographic keys in a cryptosystem, i.e.,decryption keys. In one aspect, the keys 516 may be disposed on one keyring 518 using one root key 526. In general, the keys 516 may be createdand managed using, e.g., symmetric key technology, asymmetric keytechnology, or any other key technology or combination of keytechnologies suitable for securing data in an enterprise including, forexample the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple DES, AdvancedEncryption Standard (AES), elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and soforth. The cryptosystem may also or instead include any suitable publickey infrastructure or the like supporting the distribution and use ofkeys for encryption, digital signatures, and so forth.

The key ring 518 may facilitate simplified management of the system 500.For example, by reducing the data protection system down to a single keyring 518, the system can eliminate or reduce the overhead for managementof keys 516. In one aspect, all of the data on a key ring 518 isprotected by one root key 526. By reducing the data protection systemdown to a single key ring 518 protected by one root key 526, allprivileged users 512 on uncompromised platforms can have access to allprotected data. In this embodiment, data is either ‘IN’ (i.e.,encrypted), or it's ‘OUT’ (i.e., not encrypted). In one aspect, thedefault system does not include any additional level or granularity ofaccess control.

The cryptography library 524 may be disposed on the administration host504 as shown in FIG. 5. The cryptography library 524 may also bedisposed on the endpoint 502, e.g., in a web browser, or it may bedisposed on another component of the system 500, or any combination ofthese. The cryptographic library 524 may be installed by anadministrator. In general, key material 530 from the key ring 518 may bestored in a cache 532 on the endpoint 502 within any suitable memory onthe endpoint 502 for use in encryption and decryption as contemplatedherein. As noted above, an enterprise that systematically uses coloringand indications of compromise can be improved through the use of asynchronized or integrated key management system as contemplated herein.This system may be still further improved with the addition of aheartbeat system that communicates heartbeats from an endpointcontaining health and status information about the endpoint. A suitableheartbeat system is now described in greater detail.

FIG. 6 illustrates a threat management system using heartbeats. Ingeneral, a system 600 may include an endpoint 602, a gateway 604, athreat management system 606, and an enterprise management system 608that manages an enterprise including the endpoint 602, the gateway 604,and one or more additional endpoints 610. Each of these components maybe configured with suitable programming to participate in the detectionand remediation of an advanced persistent threat (APT) or other malwarethreat as contemplated herein.

The endpoint 602 may be any of the endpoints described herein, or anyother device or network asset that might join or participate in anenterprise network. The endpoint 602 may contain a threat 612 such as anadvanced persistent threat, virus, or similar malware that resides onthe endpoint 602. The threat 612 may have reached the endpoint 602 in avariety of ways, and may have been placed manually or automatically onthe endpoint 602 by a malicious source. It will be understood that thethreat 612 may take any number of forms and have any number ofcomponents. For example, the threat 612 may include an executable filethat can execute independently, or the threat 612 may be a macro,plug-in, or the like that executes within another application.Similarly, the threat 612 may manifest as one or more processes orthreads executing on the endpoint 602. The threat 612 may install from afile on the endpoint 602 or a file remote from the endpoint 602, and thethreat 612 may create one or more other files such as data files or thelike while executing. Advanced persistent threats can be particularlydifficult to detect and remediate, and the systems and methodscontemplated herein can advantageously provide improved sensitivity tosuch threats, as well as enabling improved remediation strategies.However, the systems and methods contemplated herein may also or insteadbe used to detect and remediate other types of malware threats. As such,in this context references to a particular type of threat (e.g., anadvanced persistent threat) should be understood to generally includeany type of malware or other threat to an endpoint or enterprise unlessa more specific threat or threat type is explicitly provided orotherwise clear from the context.

The threat 612 may be analyzed by one or more threat countermeasures onthe endpoint 602 such as a whitelisting filter 614 that approves eachitem of code before executing on the endpoint 602 and prevents executionof non-whitelisted code. The endpoint 602 may also include an antivirusengine 616 or other malware detection software that uses any of avariety of techniques to identify malicious code by reputation or othercharacteristics. A runtime detection engine 618 may also monitorexecuting code to identify possible threats. More generally, any of avariety of threat detection techniques may be applied to the threat 612before and during execution. In general, a threat 612 may evade theseand other security measures and begin executing as a process 620 on theendpoint 602.

Network traffic 622 from the process 620 may be monitored and logged bya traffic monitor 624 on the endpoint 602. The traffic monitor 624 may,for example, logs a time and a source of each network request from theendpoint 602. Where the endpoint 602 is within an enterprise network,the network traffic 622 may pass through the gateway 604 in transit to adata network such as the Internet. While the gateway 604 may belogically or physically positioned between the endpoint 602 and anexternal data network, it will be understood that other configurationsare possible. For example, where the endpoint 602 is associated with anenterprise network but operating remotely, the endpoint 602 may form aVPN or other secure tunnel or the like to the gateway 604 for use of athreat management system 606, enterprise management system 608, and anyother enterprise resources.

The endpoint 602 may use a heartbeat 626 to periodically and securelycommunicate status to the gateway 604. The heartbeat 626 may be createdby a health monitor 628 within the endpoint 602, and may be transmittedto a remote health monitor 630 at the gateway 604. The health monitor628 may monitor system health in a variety of ways, such as by checkingthe status of individual software items executing on the endpoint 602,checking that antivirus and other security software is up to date (e.g.,with current virus definition files and so forth) and running correctly,checking the integrity of cryptographic key stores, checking forcompliance with enterprise security policies, and checking any otherhardware or software components of the endpoint 602 as necessary orhelpful for health monitoring. The health monitor 628 may thus conditionthe issuance of a heartbeat 626 on a satisfactory status of the endpoint602 according to any suitable criteria, enterprise polices, and otherevaluation techniques.

The heartbeat 626 may be secured in any suitable manner so that thehealth monitor 630 can reliably confirm the source of the heartbeat 626and the status of the endpoint 602. To this end, the heartbeat 626 maybe cryptographically signed or secured using a private key so that themonitor 630 can authenticate the origin of the heartbeat 626 using acorresponding public key. In one aspect, the heartbeat 626 may include acombination of plaintext information and encrypted information, such aswhere the status information for the endpoint is provided in plaintextwhile a digital signature for authentication is cryptographicallysecured. In another aspect, all of the information in the heartbeat 626may be encrypted.

In one aspect, a key vault 632 may be provided on the endpoint tosupport cryptographic functions associated with a secure heartbeat. Anobfuscated key vault 632 may support numerous useful functions,including without limitation, private key decryption, asymmetricsigning, and validation with a chain of trust to a specific rootvalidation certificate. A variety of suitable key management andcryptographic systems are known in the art and may be usefully employedto a support the use of a secure heartbeat as contemplated herein. Thesystem may support a secure heartbeat in numerous ways. For example, thesystem may ensure that signing and decryption keys can only be used inauthorized ways and inside an intended Access Control mechanism. Thesystem may use “anti-lifting” techniques to ensure that a signing keycan only be used when the endpoint is healthy. The system may ensurethat attacking software cannot, without first reverse-engineering thekey vault 632, extract the original key material. The system may alsousefully ensure that an attacker cannot undetectably replace the publickeys in a root certificate store, either directly or indirectly, such asin an attack that tries to cause the code to validate against adifferent set of root keys without directly replacing any keys in theroot store.

A robust heartbeat 626 may usefully provide defensive mechanisms againstreverse engineering of obfuscated content (e.g., the private keymaterial stored in key vault 632, the code used to validate the correctrunning of the remainder of the systems as part of the heartbeat 626code itself) and any anti-lifting protections to prevent malware fromdirectly using the endpoint 602 (or the health monitor 628 on theendpoint 602) to continue to send out signed heartbeat packets (e.g.stating that “all is well” with the endpoint) after security mechanismshave been impaired, disabled, or otherwise compromised in any way.Lifting in this manner by malicious code can be materially mitigated byproviding statistical validation (e.g., with checksums of code) of callstacks, calling processes, and core processes. Likewise, statisticalchecks as well as checksum integrations into the cryptographiccalculations may protect against code changes in the heartbeat 626 codeitself.

A variety of useful techniques may be employed to improve security ofthe key vault 632 and the heartbeat 626. For example, the system may usedomain shifting so that original key material is inferred based onhardware and software properties readily available to the key vault 632,and to ensure that key material uses non-standard algorithms. Softwareproperties may, for example, include readily determined system valuessuch as hashes of nearby code. In another aspect, the keys may be domainshifted in a manner unique to the endpoint 602 so that the manner ofstatistical validation of call stacks and core software is unique to theendpoint 602. Further the key vault may be provisioned so that a publickey stored in the key vault 632 is signed with a certificate (or into acertificate chain) that can be externally validated by a networkappliance or other trusted third party or directly by the health monitor628 or remote health monitor 630.

The heartbeat 626 may encode any useful status information, and may betransmitted from the endpoint 602 on any desired schedule including anyperiodic, aperiodic, random, deterministic, or other schedule.Configured in this manner, the heartbeat 626 can provide secure,tamper-resistant instrumentation for status of the endpoint 602, and inparticular an indication that the endpoint 602 is online anduncompromised. A delay or disappearance of the heartbeat 626 from theendpoint 602 may indicate that the endpoint 602 has been compromised;however this may also simply indicate that the endpoint 602 has beenpowered off or intentionally disconnected from the network. Thus, othercriteria may be used in addition to the disappearance or interruption ofthe heartbeat 626 to more accurately detect malicious software. Somesuch techniques are described below, but it will be understood that thismay include any supplemental information that might tend to make anattack on the endpoint 602 more or less likely. For example, if theheartbeat 626 is interrupted but the endpoint 602 is still sourcingnetwork traffic, then an inference might suitably be made that theendpoint 602 is compromised.

The threat management system 606 may, in general, be any of the threatmanagement systems described herein. The enterprise management system608 generally provides tools and interfaces for administration of theenterprise and various endpoints 610 and other resources or assetsattached thereto. It will be understood that, the functions of thethreat management system 606 and the enterprise management system 608may vary, and general threat management and administration functions maybe distributed in a variety of ways between and among these and othercomponents. This is generally indicated in FIG. 6 as a threat managementfacility 650 that includes the threat management system 606 and theenterprise management system 608. It will be understood that either orboth of these system may be administered by third parties on behalf ofthe enterprise, or managed completely within the enterprise, or somecombination of these, all without departing from the scope of thisdisclosure. It will similarly be understood that a reference herein to athreat management facility 650 is not intended to imply any particularcombination of functions or components, and shall only be understood toinclude such functions or components as explicitly stated in aparticular context, or as necessary to provide countermeasures formalware (e.g., advanced persistent threats) as contemplated herein.

FIG. 7 shows an architecture for endpoint protection in an enterprisenetwork security system. In general, an endpoint may include aprocessing environment 702, a file system 706 (such as a data storagesystem or the like), a threat monitor 720 and a key wrapper 730.

The processing environment 702 may, for example, be any environment suchas an operating system or the like suitable for executing one or moreprocesses 704.

Each process 704 may be an instance of a software application, computerprogram, portion of a computer program or other code executing withinthe processing environment 702. A process 704 may execute, e.g., on aprocessor, group of processors, or other processing circuitry orplatform for executing computer-executable code. A process 704 mayinclude executable computer code, as well as an allocation of memory,file descriptors or handles for data sources and sinks, securityattributes such as an owner and any associated permissions, and acontext including the content of physical memory used by the process704. A process 704 may be or may include one or more threads. Moregenerally, a process 704 may include any code executing on an endpointsuch as any of the endpoints described herein.

The file system 706 may include a data storage system or the like, e.g.,where a data store including one or more files (e.g., the files 708shown in the figure) is included as part of the data storage system. Thefile system 706 may be generally associated with an operating systemthat provides the processing environment 702, and serves as anintermediary between processes 704 executing in the processingenvironment 702 and one or more files 708 accessible to the endpoint.The file system 706 may provide a directory structure or other constructto facilitate organization of the files 708, and the file system 706generally supports file functions such as creating, deleting, opening,closing, reading, writing, and so forth.

An extension 710 may be included in the file system 706 by modifying theoperating system kernel. While other programming techniques may beemployed to perform the functions of an extension 710 as contemplatedherein, direct modifications to the operating system permit theextension 710 to operate transparently to the processing environment 702and the processes 704 without requiring any modifications oradaptations. The extension 710 may, for example, be implemented as afile system filter (in a MICROSOFT WINDOWS environment) or a mount pointto a directory (in an APPLE iOS environment). The extension 710 to thefiles system as contemplated herein performs two concurrent functions.First, the extension 710 communicates with a threat monitor 720 in orderto receive updates on the security status and exposure status of theprocesses 704 or the endpoint. Second, the extension 710 communicateswith a key wrapper 730 that provides key material for encrypting anddecrypting data in the files 708. Finally, the extension 710 operates toconditionally provide encryption and decryption of the files 708 for theprocesses 704 based on a current security or exposure state, asdescribed in greater detail below.

The threat monitor 720 may include any suitable threat monitoring,malware detection, antivirus program or the like suitable for monitoringand reporting on a security state of an endpoint or individual processes704 executing thereon. This may include local threat monitoring using,e.g., behavioral analysis or static analysis. The threat monitor 720 mayalso or instead use reputation to evaluate the security state ofprocesses 704 based on the processes 704 themselves, source files orexecutable code for the processes 704, or network activity initiated bythe processes 704. For example, if a process 704 requests data from aremote URL that is known to have a bad reputation, this information maybe used to infer a compromised security state of the endpoint. While athreat monitor 720 may operate locally, the threat monitor 720 may alsoor instead use remote resources such as a gateway carrying traffic toand from the endpoint, or a remote threat management facility thatprovides reputation information, malware signatures, policy informationand the like for the endpoint and other devices within an enterprisesuch as the enterprise described above.

The threat monitor 720 may also or instead monitor the health of one ormore of the system, an endpoint, a process 704, and so forth. The healthmonitoring may be used to provide periodic or aperiodic information fromone or more system components about system health, security, status, andso forth. Implementations may include using the health monitoring forcontrolling access, e.g., to files 708, to keys 734, to key material forencrypting and decrypting individual files 708, and so forth.

In general, the threat monitor 720 provides monitoring of a securitystate and an exposure state of the endpoint. The security state may, forexample, be ‘compromised’, ‘secure’, or some other state or combinationof states. This may be based on detections of known malware, suspiciousactivity, policy violations and so forth. The exposure state may be‘exposed’ or ‘unexposed’, reflecting whether or not a particular process704 or file 708 has been exposed to potentially unsafe content. Thusexposure does not necessarily represent a specific threat, but thepotential for exposure to unsafe content. This may be tracked in avariety of ways, such as by using the coloring system described abovewith reference to FIG. 5.

The key wrapper 730 may contain a key ring 732 with one or more keys 734for encrypting and decrypting files 708. The key ring 732 may becryptographically protected within the key wrapper 730 in order toprevent malicious access thereto, and the key wrapper 730 maycommunicate with the extension 710 to provide keys 734 for accessing thefiles 708 at appropriate times, depending, for example, on whetherprocesses 704 are secure or exposed. In one aspect, the files 708 arestored in a non-volatile memory such as a disk drive, or in a randomaccess memory that provides a cache for the disk drive, and the keywrapper 730 may be stored in a separate physical memory such as avolatile memory accessible to the operating system and the extension 710but not to processes 704 executing in the user space of the processingenvironment 702.

In one aspect, every document or file on the endpoint may have aseparate key. This may be, for example, a unique, symmetric key that canbe used for encryption and decryption of the corresponding file. The keywrapper 730 may control access to the key material for encrypting anddecrypting individual files, and may be used by the extension 710 tocontrol access by individual processes 704 executing on the endpoint. Asdescribed herein, the extension 710 may generally control access tofiles 708 based on an exposure state, a security state, or other contextsuch as the user of a calling process or the like. In the event of asevere compromise, or a detection of a compromise independent ofparticular processes, a key shredding procedure may be invoked todestroy the entire key wrapper 730 immediately and prevent any furtheraccess to the files 708. In such circumstances, the keys can only berecovered by the endpoint when a remediation is confirmed.Alternatively, the files may be accessed directly and decrypted from asecure, remote resource that can access the keys 734.

FIG. 8 shows a method for securing an endpoint. In general, all of thefiles within the file system may be encrypted to place them in aprotected state, and then a file system extension such as any of theextensions described above may be used to conditionally grant access byprocesses to the encrypted files.

As shown in step 802, the method 800 may begin with encrypting aplurality of files on an endpoint to prevent unauthorized access to theplurality of files. This may, for example, include encrypting filesusing an extension to a file system such as a file system filter, mountpoint, or other suitable extension to an interface between a userenvironment for executing processes and a files stored in memory on theendpoint. Encryption may be performed for all content on the endpointwhen the endpoint is created or initialized, or when the file systemextension is added an operating system for the endpoint, or at someother useful or convenient time. In one aspect, encryption may beperformed as a background process over an extended period of time sothat the endpoint can remain in use during an initial encryptionprocess. In another aspect, encryption may be performed when files areaccessed for the first time, or the initial encryption may be scheduledfor a time when the endpoint is not typically in use, e.g., early hoursof the morning.

As shown in step 804, the method 800 may include receiving a request toaccess one of the files from a process executing on the endpoint. Ingeneral, this includes receiving an access request at a file system, orat a file system filter or mount point for the file system, or any otherextension to file system described herein. With files encrypted asdescribed above, the file system may operate in an ordinary fashion andtransparently to the process (or a computing environment for theprocess) to provide file access functions such as opening, closing,creating, deleting, reading, writing, and so forth, while managingencryption and decryption through the file system extension. The fileaccess function may include an access request as generally contemplatedby step 804, which may initially include a request to open or create afile, and may subsequently include read or write operations or otherconventional file functions.

As shown in step 806, the method 800 may include decrypting the one ofthe files for the process. In general, this may be performedtransparently by the file system. That is, the process(es) accessingfiles that are managed by the file system do not need any cryptographicinformation or other programming overhead. Rather, they simply initiaterequests to the file system in a conventional manner, and the filesystem applies an extension such as any of those described above tomanage cryptographic access to files stored by the file system subjectto any of the conditions contemplated herein (e.g., an appropriatesecurity state or exposure state). The file system extension may in turnconditionally provide encryption and decryption functions based on acurrent security state of the process. In general, all of the filesmanaged by the file system may be encrypted, and decrypting a file mayinclude accessing a cryptographic key for the files (or for each of thefiles) using a file system filter, mount point, or other file systemextension and applying the cryptographic key to decrypt the one of thefiles.

In one aspect, the file system extension (e.g., file system filter ormount point) may be configured to respond to an indication of a severecompromise (e.g., the entire endpoint, multiple processes, or a known,severe threat) by deleting key material stored on the endpoint toprevent all access to files within the file system. Any suitable keyrecovery techniques may be used to recover the deleted key material oncea compromise has been fully resolved. Key recovery may include local keyrecovery techniques, remote key recovery techniques, or some combinationof these. This provides a technique for completely disabling orprotecting an endpoint against further data leakage or damage when asevere compromise is detected.

As shown in step 808, the method 800 may include using the file that hasbeen accessed, such as by reading data from the file, writing data tothe file, closing the file, saving the file, and so forth.

As shown in step 810, the method 800 may include monitoring a securitystate of the process that accessed the file. In general, monitoring maybe performed by code within the file system extension, or monitoring maybe performed by one or more local or remote processes for monitoringreputation, integrity, health, security and the like, any or all ofwhich may communicate with the file system extension to provide updateson a security state of the process or an endpoint executing the process.Monitoring may employ any of the techniques contemplated herein. By wayof non-limiting examples, this may include behavior analysis such asdetecting a compromised state of the process based on a behavior of theprocess, a behavior of an associated process, and a behavior of theendpoint. This may also or instead include static analysis such aslocally monitoring the process with a file scanner that performs staticanalysis on related files such as a file (or files) that the processlaunches from, or a file (or files) that get loaded into the processduring execution.

More generally, monitoring the security state of the process may includemonitoring observable behaviors for the process. This may include apattern of file behavior by the process such as reading, writing,creating, deleting, and combinations of the foregoing. This may also orinstead include persistence behavior such as writing to a registry orother locations that contain code used at startup to initialize anendpoint by the process (e.g., writing to a registry). In anotheraspect, this may include inter-process communications such ascommunications between processes and other process-related actions suchas creation of a new process, thread injection, memory injection, and soforth. In another aspect, this may include direct detection of exploitsbased on specific behaviors, or detection of files loaded into theprocess that may contain harmful features such as shared dynamic linkedlibraries, user data files, templates, macros, and so forth.

Monitoring the security state may also or instead include monitoringnetwork behavior such as network traffic associated with the process.For network traffic, coloring techniques such as those described abovemay be used to label network traffic to facilitate identification andtracking. For example, monitoring the security state of the process mayinclude adding an application identifier to the network trafficoriginating from the process, wherein the application identifierexplicitly identifies an application associated with the process andmonitoring network traffic from the process at a gateway between theendpoint and a data network based on the application identifier. Theendpoint may also log relevant information to facilitate suchmonitoring. For example, monitoring may include generating a log ofnetwork requests by logging network requests and applications making thenetwork requests. With network behavior locally logged in this manner,monitoring the security state may further include storing an applicationidentifier in the log of network requests, where the applicationidentifier explicitly identifies an application associated with a sourceprocess for a network request, and monitoring network requests from theapplication at a gateway between the endpoint and a data network basedon the application identifier.

As shown in step 812, the security state may be evaluated to determinewhether the security state has become a compromised state. The securitystate may be updated periodically or on a fixed or variable schedule, sothat the current security state is available for evaluation. Thesecurity state may be queried at the time of evaluation. This evaluationmay occur periodically on some fixed or variable schedule, or inresponse to other events, or the evaluation may be performed orinitiated by an external software component that pushes notifications tothe file system extension when exposures are detected. If the securitystate is ‘not compromised’ (e.g., a ‘no’ to a compromised inquiry) thenthe endpoint point may continue to operate in the ordinary fashion andthe method 800 may return to step 808 where the open file is used. Ifthe security state is a compromised state (a ‘yes’ to the compromisedinquiry), then the method 800 may proceed to step 814 where additionalaction can be taken. Evaluation of the security state may include theapplication of one or more rules, e.g., behavior rules. The rules may beapplied to the process that accessed the file, to an endpoint, or toanother component of the system. Evaluation of the security state mayinclude a behavioral analysis or a static analysis. Evaluation of thesecurity state may also or instead include the use of one or morereputations of processes, e.g., based on the processes themselves,source files, executable code for the processes, activity initiated bythe processes, and the like. Evaluation of the security state mayinclude the use of remote resources such as a gateway carrying trafficto and from the endpoint, or a remote threat management facility thatprovides reputation information, malware signatures, policy information,and the like. Evaluation of the security state may also or insteadinclude a system health status evaluation and the like.

As shown in step 814, while the executing process is in the compromisedstate, the method 800 may include maintaining access to any open ones ofthe plurality of files including the file requested in step 804. Ingeneral, access may be maintained by continuing to provideencryption/decryption for the open files through a file system extensionas described above, or using any other analogous technique. In thismanner, the process may continue to execute, preventing a catastrophicor inconvenient termination of an application or the like for the user.The user may continue to use a file, save the file, or otherwisecontinue with a process in any suitable manner. This may expose someencrypted files within the file system to potentially harmful processes.However, an inference can be made that by the time a compromise isdetected, the open files have already been potentially affected. At thispoint, the remediation strategy can shift to preventing a further spreadof harmful impact to other files and data on the endpoint whileminimizing impact to the current user.

As shown in step 816 the method 800 may include including prohibitingaccess to other ones of the plurality of files. In general, access maybe prohibited by withholding encryption/decryption functions for theother files through a file system extension as described above, or usingany other analogous technique. Prohibiting access may includeprohibiting access to all other files managed by the file system, orpermitting access to some files while prohibiting access to a subset offiles that are identified as protected, confidential, or otherwiselabeled for heightened protection. In this manner, when a compromise isdetected, the compromised process may continue to execute while beingisolated from other files that the process has not yet touched.

As shown in step 818, the method 800 may include providing anotification to a user in a display of the endpoint. The notificationmay indicate a required remediation step for the process to resolve thecompromised state, and the notification may inform the user that anapplication associated with the process cannot access additional filesuntil the user completes the required remediation step. For example, thenotification may include a pop-up window or the like with text stating:“Process X is compromised. You must close all files and restart thisprocess before accessing other content with Process X.” The notificationmay include a number of buttons or the like such as “okay”, “remediatenow,” “remediate later,” and so forth.

As shown in step 820, the method 800 may include initiating aremediation of the process. In one aspect, this may include facilitatinga restart of the process, such as in response to a user input receivedfrom the notification described above.

As shown in step 822, the method 800 may include remediating thecompromise. Where the compromise is dynamic in nature, e.g., based oncode loaded into an executing process, a restart of the process may besufficient to fully remediate the compromised state. However, additionalremediation steps may be required including registry repair, removal orreinstallation of an application, deletion of files or other clean upand remediation. A variety of tools are known in the art and may beusefully deployed to attempt remediation based upon the nature of thecompromised state.

As shown in step 824, the remediation may be evaluated for success. Ifthe remediation is successful, the method 800 may proceed to step 826where access is restored by the process to the plurality of filesmanaged by the file system. The process may then return to step 808where files are used in the ordinary manner and encryption anddecryption services are transparently provided to the process by thefile system extension. If the remediation is unsuccessful, then theprocess may return to step 814 where the process can continue to accessopen files but no other files. In this latter case of unsuccessfulremediation, additional steps may be taken, such as quarantining anendpoint, permanently disabling the process, or otherwise applyingheightened restrictions to the endpoint or the process.

An endpoint such as any of the endpoints described above may beconfigured according to the foregoing method 800 to provide endpointsecurity. Thus in one aspect, a system disclosed herein includes anendpoint with a first memory storing a plurality of files that aremanaged by a file system and encrypted to prevent unauthorized access,as well as a second memory that stores key material for decrypting theplurality of files. The first memory and the second memory may beseparate physical memories such as a non-volatile disk-based memorystoring the plurality of files and a volatile random access memorystoring the key material. The endpoint may include a processor and aprocess executing on the processor. A file system executing on theprocessor may be configured to manage access to the plurality of filesby the process, and may be further configured to respond to a requestfrom the process for one of the files by conditionally decrypting theone of the files based on a security state of the process. As describedabove, the file system may conditionally decrypt files using anextension to an operating system of the endpoint such as a file systemfilter, mount point, or other extension.

The system may include a gateway such as any of the gateways describedabove. The gateway may be coupled in a communicating relationship withthe endpoint and configured to monitor the security state of the processbased on network traffic or other behavioral observations for theprocess. The system may also or instead include a threat managementfacility such as any of the threat management facilities described abovecoupled in a communicating relationship with the endpoint and configuredto remotely monitor the security state of the process based onindications of compromise received from the endpoint.

FIG. 9 shows a method for securing an endpoint. In general, the method900 may operate in a similar manner to the method described above, witha notable exception that the overall method 900 monitors exposure of aprocess to potentially unsafe content rather than detecting compromisedstates. It will be appreciated that the method 900 of FIG. 9 may be usedinstead of or in addition to the method 800 of FIG. 8. That is the twomethods may be applied sequentially or in parallel, or some combinationof these, by incorporating suitable code/logic into a file systemextension that controls access to a cryptographically secured filesystem.

As shown in step 902, the method 900 may begin with encrypting aplurality of files on an endpoint to prevent unauthorized access to theplurality of files. This may, for example, include encrypting filesusing an extension to a file system such as a file system filter, mountpoint, or other suitable extension to an interface between a userenvironment for executing processes and files stored in memory on theendpoint. Encryption may be performed for all content on the endpointwhen the endpoint is created or initialized, or when the file systemextension is added an operating system for the endpoint, or at someother useful or convenient time. In one aspect, encryption may beperformed as a background process over an extended period of time sothat the endpoint can remain in use during an initial encryptionprocess. In another aspect, encryption may be performed when files areaccessed for the first time, or the initial encryption may be scheduledfor a time when the endpoint is not typically in use, e.g., early hoursof the morning.

As shown in step 904, the method 900 may include receiving a request toaccess one of the files from a process executing on the endpoint. Ingeneral, this includes receiving an access request at a file system, orat a file system filter or mount point for the file system, or any otherextension to file system described herein. With files encrypted asdescribed above, the file system may operate in an ordinary fashion andtransparently to the process (or a computing environment for theprocess) to provide file access functions such as opening, closing,creating, deleting, reading, writing, and so forth, while managingencryption and decryption through the file system extension. The fileaccess function may include an access request as generally contemplatedby step 804, which may initially include a request to open or create afile, and may subsequently include read or write operations or otherconventional file functions.

As shown in step 906, the method 900 may include decrypting the one ofthe files for the process. In general, this may be performedtransparently by the file system. That is, the process(es) accessingfiles that are managed by the file system do not need any cryptographicinformation or other programming overhead. Rather, they simply initiaterequests to the file system in a conventional manner, and the filesystem applies an extension such as any of those described above tomanage cryptographic access to files stored by the file system subjectto any of the conditions contemplated herein (e.g., an appropriatesecurity state or exposure state). The file system extension may in turnconditionally provide encryption and decryption functions based on acurrent security state of the process. In general, all of the filesmanaged by the file system may be encrypted, and decrypting a file mayinclude accessing a cryptographic key for the files using a file systemfilter, mount point, or other file system extension and applying thecryptographic key to decrypt the one of the files.

In one aspect, the file system extension (e.g., file system filter ormount point) may be configured to respond to an indication of acompromise, or an indication of a severe compromise (e.g., the entireendpoint, multiple processes, or a known, severe threat) by deleting acryptographic key or other key material stored on the endpoint toprevent all access to files within the file system. Any suitable keyrecovery techniques may be used to recover the deleted key material oncea compromise has been fully resolved. Key recovery may include local keyrecovery techniques, remote key recovery techniques, or some combinationof these. This provides a technique for completely disabling orprotecting an endpoint against further data leakage or damage when asevere compromise is detected.

As shown in step 908, the method 900 may include using the file that hasbeen accessed, such as by reading data from the file, writing data tothe file, closing the file, saving the file, and so forth.

As shown in step 910, the method 900 may include monitoring an exposurestate of the process on the endpoint to potentially unsafe content. Ingeneral, exposure will have a state of ‘exposed’ or ‘secure’ is based onactual or potential exposure of an executing process to potentiallyunsafe content such as risky network locations, files outside theencrypted file system, and so forth. A variety of rules may be used todetect exposure.

In general, monitoring the exposure state of the process to potentiallyunsafe content may include applying a plurality of behavioral rules todetermine whether the exposure state of the process is either exposed orsecure. Under a basic rule set, the process may be initially identifiedas secure, and then identified as exposed based on contact with contentother than the plurality of files securely managed by the file system.In another aspect, a process may be initially categorized as exposeduntil a source, user, or other aspects of the process are authenticated.For example, in some implementations, a process may be initiallyidentified as secure, and a process may be identified as exposed whenthe process makes a network request to a URL that has or is assigned apoor reputation or fits a suspicious pattern. In some implementations, aprocess may be initially identified as secure, and a process may beidentified as exposed when the process requests or opens a file that isidentified as exposed. In some implementations, a process may beinitially identified as secure, and a process may be identified asexposed when another process opens a handle to the process.

In one aspect, exposure may be measured using a simplified rule setwherein (1) the process is initially identified as secure, (2) theprocess is identified as exposed when the process opens a networkconnection to a Uniform Resource Locator that is not internal to anenterprise network of the endpoint and that has a reputation that ispoor, (3) the process is identified as exposed when the process opens afirst file that is identified as exposed, and (4) the process isidentified as exposed when another exposed process opens a handle to theprocess. The reputation of the Uniform Resource Locator may be obtainedfrom a remote threat management facility such as any of the remotethreat management facilities described herein, or the reputation may belooked up in a local database or the like. Where exposure of the firstfile is used as a basis for determining when the process is exposed,exposure of the first file may be determined in a variety of ways. Forexample, the first file may be labeled or colored as exposed using thetechniques described above, based on some prior context or activity forthe file. Or the file may be identified as exposed based on a scan ofthe file for the presence of malware or the like.

Other conditions or rules may also or instead be used to measure when aprocess is exposed to potentially unsafe content. For example, themethod 900 may include identifying the first file as exposed when atleast one of the following conditions is met: (1) the first file is notone of the plurality of files; (2) the first file is saved by a secondprocess that is identified as exposed; and (3) a source of the firstfile has a low reputation.

As shown in step 912, the process may be evaluated for exposure topotentially unsafe content. This evaluation may occur periodically onsome fixed or variable schedule, or in response to other events, or theevaluation may be performed by an external software component thatpushes notifications to the file system extension when exposures aredetected. When the process is not exposed (i.e., the exposure state is‘secure’), the process may return to step 908 and continue to use fileswithin the file system. When the process is exposed, then the method 900proceeds to step 914.

As shown in step 914, when the process is exposed the method 900 mayinclude restricting access by the process to the files managed by thefile system, more specifically by controlling access to the filesthrough a file system filter or other extension to the file system thatconditionally decrypts one or more of the plurality of files for theprocess according to the exposure state of the process. In this context,restricting access by the process to the files may include maintainingaccess to any of the plurality of files that have been opened by theprocess before the process became exposed, and preventing access toother ones of the plurality of files, all as generally described aboveby way of example in the method 800 of FIG. 8.

As shown in step 918, the method 800 may include providing anotification to a user in a display of the endpoint. The notificationmay indicate a required remediation step for the process to resolve theexposed state, and the notification may inform the user that anapplication associated with the process cannot access additional filesuntil the user completes the required remediation step. For example, thenotification may include a pop-up window or the like with text stating:“Process X is exposed to potentially unsafe content. You must close allfiles and restart this process before accessing other content withProcess X.” The notification may include a number of buttons or the likesuch as “okay”, “remediate now,” “remediate later,” and so forth.

As shown in step 920, the method 800 may include initiating aremediation of the process. In one aspect, this may include facilitatinga restart of the process, such as in response to a user input receivedfrom the notification described above, or automatically in the absenceof user input.

As shown in step 922, the method 800 may include remediating theexposure. In one aspect, this may include restarting the process. Othersteps may include closing or deleting the files that caused theexposure, scanning the endpoint for related content or potentialthreats, and so forth. The process may also be scanned after a restartto determine whether the exposure has resulted in any instantiation ofmalware or the like. A variety of other tools are known in the art andmay be usefully deployed to attempt remediation based upon the nature ofthe exposed state.

As shown in step 924, the remediation may be evaluated for success. Ifthe remediation is successful, the method 800 may proceed to step 926where access is restored for the process to the plurality of filesmanaged by the file system. The process may then return to step 908where files are used in the ordinary manner and encryption anddecryption services are transparently provided to the process by thefile system extension. If the remediation is unsuccessful, then theprocess may return to step 914 where the process can continue to accessopen files but no other files. In this latter case of unsuccessfulremediation, additional steps may be taken, such as quarantining anendpoint, permanently disabling the process, or otherwise applyingheightened restrictions to the endpoint or the process.

It will be appreciated that the method for evaluating exposure asdescribed with respect to FIG. 9 may be used exclusively, or may be usedconcurrently or sequentially with the method for evaluating compromisedescribed with reference to FIG. 8. That is, a method may usefullymonitor a security state and an exposure state at the same time, and useeither or both of these states to improve endpoint security ascontemplated herein. In another aspect, both compromise and exposure maybe collectively tracked as two different values to a single securitystate, with rules applied by the file system extension for file accessand remediation according to value. Thus, while monitoring exposure, themethod 900 may also include monitoring a security state of the processand restricting access by the process to the plurality of files when thesecurity state is compromised. As described above, monitoring thesecurity state may include monitoring the security state at a threatmanagement facility or locally monitoring the security state with amalware file scanner.

In another aspect an endpoint such as any of the endpoints describedabove may implement the techniques for exposure monitoring and responseas described above. A corresponding system may include an endpoint witha processor and a first memory storing a plurality of files that areencrypted to prevent unauthorized access. A process may be executing onthe endpoint, and a file system on the endpoint may be configured tomanage access to the plurality of files by the process. The file systemmay include an extension such as a file system filter or a mount pointconfigured to monitor an exposure state of the process and to restrictaccess to the one of the files based on the exposure state of theprocess by conditionally decrypting the one of the files based on theexposure state. The file system may maintain access to any of the filesthat have been opened by the process before the process became exposed,while preventing access to other ones of the files. The endpoint mayinclude an integrity monitor such as the threat monitor described aboveconfigured to evaluate the exposure state by applying a plurality ofbehavioral rules to determine whether the exposure state of the processis either exposed or secure, wherein the process is initially identifiedas secure and the process is identified as exposed based on contact withcontent other than the plurality of files. The endpoint may include aremediation component configured to remediate the process using any ofthe techniques described herein and return the process from the exposedstate to the secure state for unrestricted access to the plurality offiles. The remediation component may include any software component,either local to the endpoint or remote from the endpoint, or somecombination of these containing code adapted to delete, uninstall,quarantine, isolate, reconfigure, reprogram, monitor or otherwiseremediate malicious or potentially malicious code on the endpoint.

The integrity monitor may be further configured to identify the processas exposed according to the plurality of behavioral rules, wherein (1)the process is identified as exposed when the process opens a networkconnection to a Uniform Resource Locator that is not internal to anenterprise network of the endpoint and that has a reputation that ispoor, (2) the process is identified as exposed when the process opens afirst file that is identified as exposed, and (3) the process isidentified as exposed when another exposed process opens a handle to theprocess.

The above systems, devices, methods, processes, and the like may berealized in hardware, software, or any combination of these suitable fora particular application. The hardware may include a general-purposecomputer and/or dedicated computing device. This includes realization inone or more microprocessors, microcontrollers, embeddedmicrocontrollers, programmable digital signal processors or otherprogrammable devices or processing circuitry, along with internal and/orexternal memory. This may also, or instead, include one or moreapplication specific integrated circuits, programmable gate arrays,programmable array logic components, or any other device or devices thatmay be configured to process electronic signals. It will further beappreciated that a realization of the processes or devices describedabove may include computer-executable code created using a structuredprogramming language such as C, an object oriented programming languagesuch as C++, or any other high-level or low-level programming language(including assembly languages, hardware description languages, anddatabase programming languages and technologies) that may be stored,compiled or interpreted to run on one of the above devices, as well asheterogeneous combinations of processors, processor architectures, orcombinations of different hardware and software. In another aspect, themethods may be embodied in systems that perform the steps thereof, andmay be distributed across devices in a number of ways. At the same time,processing may be distributed across devices such as the various systemsdescribed above, or all of the functionality may be integrated into adedicated, standalone device or other hardware. In another aspect, meansfor performing the steps associated with the processes described abovemay include any of the hardware and/or software described above. Allsuch permutations and combinations are intended to fall within the scopeof the present disclosure.

Embodiments disclosed herein may include computer program productscomprising computer-executable code or computer-usable code that, whenexecuting on one or more computing devices, performs any and/or all ofthe steps thereof. The code may be stored in a non-transitory fashion ina computer memory, which may be a memory from which the program executes(such as random access memory associated with a processor), or a storagedevice such as a disk drive, flash memory or any other optical,electromagnetic, magnetic, infrared or other device or combination ofdevices. In another aspect, any of the systems and methods describedabove may be embodied in any suitable transmission or propagation mediumcarrying computer-executable code and/or any inputs or outputs fromsame.

The elements described and depicted herein, including in flow charts andblock diagrams throughout the figures, imply logical boundaries betweenthe elements. However, according to software or hardware engineeringpractices, the depicted elements and the functions thereof may beimplemented on machines through computer executable media having aprocessor capable of executing program instructions stored thereon as amonolithic software structure, as standalone software modules, or asmodules that employ external routines, code, services, and so forth, orany combination of these, and all such implementations may be within thescope of the present disclosure. Examples of such machines may include,but may not be limited to, personal digital assistants, laptops,personal computers, mobile phones, other handheld computing devices,medical equipment, wired or wireless communication devices, transducers,chips, calculators, satellites, tablet PCs, electronic books, gadgets,electronic devices, devices having artificial intelligence, computingdevices, networking equipment, servers, routers and the like.Furthermore, the elements depicted in the flow chart and block diagramsor any other logical component may be implemented on a machine capableof executing program instructions. Thus, while the foregoing drawingsand descriptions set forth functional aspects of the disclosed systems,no particular arrangement of software for implementing these functionalaspects should be inferred from these descriptions unless explicitlystated or otherwise clear from the context. Similarly, it may beappreciated that the various steps identified and described above may bevaried, and that the order of steps may be adapted to particularapplications of the techniques disclosed herein. All such variations andmodifications are intended to fall within the scope of this disclosure.As such, the depiction and/or description of an order for various stepsshould not be understood to require a particular order of execution forthose steps, unless required by a particular application, or explicitlystated or otherwise clear from the context. Absent an explicitindication to the contrary, the disclosed steps may be modified,supplemented, omitted, and/or re-ordered without departing from thescope of this disclosure. Numerous variations, additions, omissions, andother modifications will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in theart. In addition, the order or presentation of method steps in thedescription and drawings above is not intended to require this order ofperforming the recited steps unless a particular order is expresslyrequired or otherwise clear from the context.

The method steps of the implementations described herein are intended toinclude any suitable method of causing such method steps to beperformed, consistent with the patentability of the following claims,unless a different meaning is expressly provided or otherwise clear fromthe context. So for example performing the step of X includes anysuitable method for causing another party such as a remote user, aremote processing resource (e.g., a server or cloud computer) or amachine to perform the step of X. Similarly, performing steps X, Y and Zmay include any method of directing or controlling any combination ofsuch other individuals or resources to perform steps X, Y and Z toobtain the benefit of such steps. Thus method steps of theimplementations described herein are intended to include any suitablemethod of causing one or more other parties or entities to perform thesteps, consistent with the patentability of the following claims, unlessa different meaning is expressly provided or otherwise clear from thecontext. Such parties or entities need not be under the direction orcontrol of any other party or entity, and need not be located within aparticular jurisdiction.

It will be appreciated that the methods and systems described above areset forth by way of example and not of limitation. Numerous variations,additions, omissions, and other modifications will be apparent to one ofordinary skill in the art. In addition, the order or presentation ofmethod steps in the description and drawings above is not intended torequire this order of performing the recited steps unless a particularorder is expressly required or otherwise clear from the context. Thus,while particular embodiments have been shown and described, it will beapparent to those skilled in the art that various changes andmodifications in form and details may be made therein without departingfrom the spirit and scope of this disclosure and are intended to form apart of the invention as defined by the following claims, which are tobe interpreted in the broadest sense allowable by law.

What is claimed is:
 1. A computer program product for securing anendpoint against exposure to unsafe or unknown content, the computerprogram product comprising computer-executable code embodied in anon-transitory computer readable medium that, when executing on theendpoint performs the steps of: encrypting a plurality of files on anendpoint to prevent unauthorized access to the plurality of files;monitoring an exposure state of a process on the endpoint to potentiallyunsafe content by applying a plurality of behavioral rules to determinewhether the exposure state of the process is either exposed or secure,wherein (1) the process is initially identified as secure, (2) theprocess is identified as exposed when the process opens a networkconnection to a Uniform Resource Locator that is not internal to anenterprise network of the endpoint and that has a reputation that ispoor, (3) the process is identified as exposed when the process opens afirst file that is identified as exposed, and (4) the process isidentified as exposed when another exposed process opens a handle to theprocess; and restricting access by the process to the plurality of fileswhen the process is exposed by controlling access to the plurality offiles through a file system filter that conditionally decrypts one ormore of the plurality of files for the process according to the exposurestate of the process.
 2. The computer program product of claim 1 whereinthe reputation of the Uniform Resource Locator is obtained from a remotethreat management facility.
 3. The computer program product of claim 1wherein the file system filter conditionally decrypts one or more of theplurality of files using a cryptographic key, and further wherein thefile system filter is configured to respond to an indication ofcompromise for the endpoint by deleting the cryptographic key on theendpoint.
 4. The computer program product of claim 1 wherein restrictingaccess by the process to the plurality of files includes maintainingaccess to any of the plurality of files that have been opened by theprocess before the process became exposed, and preventing access toother ones of the plurality of files.
 5. A method comprising: encryptinga plurality of files on an endpoint to prevent unauthorized access tothe plurality of files; monitoring an exposure state of a process on theendpoint to potentially unsafe content by applying a plurality ofbehavioral rules to determine whether the exposure state of the processis either exposed or secure, wherein the process is initially identifiedas secure and the process is identified as exposed based on contact withcontent other than the plurality of files; and restricting access by theprocess to the plurality of files when the process is exposed.
 6. Themethod of claim 5 further comprising identifying the process as exposedaccording to the plurality of behavioral rules, wherein (1) the processis identified as exposed when the process opens a network connection toa Uniform Resource Locator that is not internal to an enterprise networkof the endpoint and that has a reputation that is poor, (2) the processis identified as exposed when the process opens a first file that isidentified as exposed, and (3) the process is identified as exposed whenanother exposed process opens a handle to the process.
 7. The method ofclaim 6 further comprising identifying the first file as exposed when atleast one of the following conditions is met: (1) the first file is notone of the plurality of files; (2) the first file is saved by a secondprocess that is identified as exposed; and (3) a source of the firstfile has a low reputation.
 8. The method of claim 6 further comprisingidentifying the first file as exposed based upon a scan of the firstfile.
 9. The method of claim 6 further comprising obtaining thereputation for the Uniform Resource Locator from a remote threatmanagement facility.
 10. The method of claim 5 wherein restrictingaccess by the process to the plurality of files includes controllingaccess through an extension to a file system for the endpoint, furtherwherein the extension conditionally decrypts one or more of theplurality of files for the process according to the exposure state ofthe process.
 11. The method of claim 10 wherein the extensionconditionally decrypts one or more of the plurality of files using acryptographic key, and further wherein the extension is configured torespond to an indication of compromise for the endpoint by deleting thecryptographic key on the endpoint.
 12. The method of claim 10 whereinthe extension includes at least one of a mount point for the file systemand a file system filter for the file system.
 13. The method of claim 5wherein restricting access by the process to the plurality of filesincludes maintaining access to any of the plurality of files that havebeen opened by the process before the process became exposed, andpreventing access to other ones of the plurality of files.
 14. Themethod of claim 5 further comprising monitoring a security state of theprocess and restricting access by the process to the plurality of fileswhen the security state is compromised.
 15. The method of claim 14wherein monitoring the security state includes remotely monitoring thesecurity state at a threat management facility or locally monitoring thesecurity state with a malware file scanner.
 16. The method of claim 5further comprising initiating a remediation of the process when theprocess is exposed, the remediation including facilitating a restart ofthe process.
 17. The method of claim 16 wherein, if the remediation issuccessful, restoring access to all of the plurality of files by theprocess.
 18. The method of claim 5 further comprising providing anotification to a user in a display of the endpoint, the notificationindicating a required remediation step for the process to resolve theexposure state, and the notification informing the user that anapplication associated with the process cannot access additional filesuntil the user completes the required remediation step.
 19. A systemcomprising: an endpoint; a first memory on the endpoint storing aplurality of files, the plurality of files encrypted to preventunauthorized access; a process executing on the endpoint; a file systemon the endpoint configured to manage access to the plurality of files bythe process, the file system including an extension configured tomonitor an exposure state of the process and to restrict access to theone of the files based on the exposure state of the process byconditionally decrypting the one of the files based on the exposurestate; an integrity monitor configured to evaluate the exposure state byapplying a plurality of behavioral rules to determine whether theexposure state of the process is either exposed or secure, wherein theprocess is initially identified as secure and the process is identifiedas exposed based on contact with content other than the plurality offiles; and a remediation component configured to remediate the processfrom the exposed state to the secure state for unrestricted access tothe plurality of files.
 20. The system of claim 19 wherein the integritymonitor is further configured to identify the process as exposedaccording to the plurality of behavioral rules, wherein (1) the processis identified as exposed when the process opens a network connection toa Uniform Resource Locator that is not internal to an enterprise networkof the endpoint and that has a reputation that is poor, (2) the processis identified as exposed when the process opens a first file that isidentified as exposed, and (3) the process is identified as exposed whenanother exposed process opens a handle to the process.